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Abstract
Does social promotion perpetuate shortfalls in student achievement, or can
low-achieving students catch up with their peers when they are pushed ahead?
Using data from Brazilian primary schools, this paper presents evidence of
substantial catch up among socially promoted students. After documenting
sorting across schools in response to the policy, in particular away from gated-
promotion private schools, we show that social promotion cycles has no signif-
icant effect on municipality enrolment figures or on the percentage of students
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dropping out mid-year. Cohorts of students exposed to episodes of social pro-
motion display higher rates of age-appropriate study than their peers who faced
the threat of repetition each year: by age eleven, 5.6 fewer students out of 100
have fallen behind in their studies, while 5.1 fewer students out of 100 are two
or more years delayed. These gains, which arise mechanically during the period
of social promotion, are highly persistent over time – even through educational
stages which are typically high-stakes. This evidence suggests that, absent the
social promotion policy, retention rates in Brazilian primary schools are inef-
ficiently high: many promoted students successfully pass gateway exams after
being pushed ahead, and go on to complete junior primary school on time.
JEL codes: I21, I28, I25
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1 Introduction
Brazil’s large-scale experimentation with social promotion provides a unique oppor-
tunity to study the impact of repetition policies on primary school children. To
combat the accumulation of students in the early grades of primary school, a policy
of social promotion ‘cycles’ was introduced in the late 1990s. This policy, which
encouraged the definition of groups of grades during which students would advance
automatically to the next level without the threat of repeating, was adopted and
implemented in different ways across the country. In some states, all schools were re-
quired to adopt the policy under similar guidelines; in others the decision was heavily
decentralised. Many school jurisdictions that adopted the policy later abandoned it,
and vice versa; across jurisdictions, the length and number of cycles also varied.
This paper exploits within-municipality variation in promotion policies to esti-
mate how cycles of social promotion affect primary-aged children’s progress through
school. We first demonstrate that the introduction of social promotion cycles has no
significant effect on municipality enrolment figures, but that students do sort across
schools in response to changes in school policies. School-level adoption of social pro-
motion is associated with an increase in enrolment at younger ages (nine and ten),
and decreases at older ages (age twelve). While we cannot track individual students,
we document that this arises in part due to net outflows from private schools in
those municipalities where social promotion has been adopted among public schools:
municipality-wide adoption of the cycles policy in public schools is associated with
a 2-7% decrease in private school enrolments, depending on the age group.
Although adoption of the policy is associated with a significant decrease in repeti-
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tion rates, the policy has no effect on the number of students dropping out mid-year.
In contrast, exposure to the social promotion policy substantially decreases the share
of students who are delayed one or more years in their studies. While this should
occur deterministically during the social promotion cycle, the effect persists for at
least five years - long after most students would again risk retention. Each year of
exposure to the policy decreases the share of students who are delayed by between
1-2%. Nearly identical point estimates are found when estimating the effect of ex-
posure to social promotion on the share of students who are delayed by two or more
years, suggesting that the policy is particularly effective at keeping potential “serial
repeaters” on track and engaged with the school system. These effects are highly
persistent over time, and cumulate with further exposure to the policy.
This paper makes three contributions. First, we estimate how primary school
students’ grade progression at different ages is affected by exposure to social promo-
tion, both in the current year and for up to six years previously. This allows us to
study not only the short- and medium-term effects of promotion on attainment, but
also how these effects cumulate.
Furthermore, we carry out our study in a country with very high baseline rep-
etition rates. This sheds light on the extent to which recent studies in the United
States can inform education policies in such settings. In contrast to much of this
recent literature, our results indicate that social promotion has a positive net effect
on student achievement in Brazil. Our results therefore suggest that current repeti-
tion rates in Brazil are too high, and that attainment would be improved by relaxing
promotion standards.
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Finally, we build on previous work by including the universe of Brazilian primary
schools in our analysis.1 Doing so allows us to offer insights into the overall impact of
the policy, while also offering the first (to our knowledge) evidence of student sorting
in response to the introduction of social promotion. While net municipal enrolment
was not affected by municipality-wide adoption of the policy, we observe substantial
changes at the school level. Schools with a social promotion policy in place attract
younger students, particularly those aged nine and ten, and repel older students
(specifically twelve-year-olds, who are the oldest age-group we look at). This is an
important finding for studies which consider this policy at the school level, as the
resulting changes in student composition pose a threat to identification.
The effects of grade repetition on the educational path of students are notoriously
difficult to identify. Traditional repetition protocols tended to rely heavily on teacher
or parental evaluations, and were therefore heavily influenced by unobserved student
characteristics. The increasing use of standardised tests, particularly in the United
States, has generated a new wave of research on grade repetition.2 The discontinuity
in repetition probabilities created by test score-based passing thresholds has gener-
ated populations of retained and promoted students who are more similar than ever
before, paving the way for the application of more rigorous empirical methods.
While results from these programmes are mixed, they offer some support for grade
repetition, particularly early in schooling. Using regression discontinuity around the
retention cut off, Jacob and Lefgren (2004) find that retention under the Chicago
1We do exclude federal schools, which represent less than 0.0005% of all primary schools.
2In the late 1990s, Chicago moved away from a system of social promotion by introducing high
stakes exams in grades three and six, accompanied by remedial summer school for students with
poor exam performance. The state of Florida has implemented a similar programme.
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programme had positive effects on subsequent test scores for students facing retention
in grade three, but no significant effects for students facing retention in grade six.
Applying a learning model to the same data, Roderick and Nagaoka (2005) reach a
more pessimistic conclusion: retention was neutral for students in grade three, but
actually harmful to students retained in grade six. In Florida, Greene and Winters
(2007) find that retention in the third grade increased grades two years later.
Despite these recent advances, research on the longer-term effects of grade rep-
etition remains rare. In a recent working paper, Schwerdt et al. (2015) estimate
the impact of retention in third grade on outcomes up to graduation for students
in Florida. The authors find that retention in third grade, along with an associated
remedial education package, increases achievement significantly, but also find that
these gains fade out over the subsequent six years. While they find that retention
in grade three decreases the probability of future retention, it has no effect on the
probability of graduating from high school. Allen et al. (2009)’s meta-analysis of
recent North American studies supports this fade-out finding more generally.
The findings discussed so far are based primarily on data from the United States,
and it is not obvious how they would translate to different contexts. Studies from
both developed and developing countries find that repetition increases drop-out risk,
suggesting some findings are robust across contexts.3 In Brazil, as in many developing
countries, repetition rates are high throughout primary school: the average first
3Using data from grade eight students in Chicago, Allensworth (2005) finds that dropout in-
creased among retained students, while for the larger group of non-retained students, dropout
decreased. André (2009) and Glick and Sahn (2010) conclude that grade repetition among primary
school students in Senegal increases the risk of dropping out. Manacorda (2012) presents similar
findings from Uruguay.
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grade repetition rate in our sample is 16% (28% if you include mid-year quits among
repeaters), and it remains close to 10% throughout primary school. While the North
American studies suggest repetition can have a positive effect on learning, there has
been little research on what the appropriate repetition threshold should be.
Koppensteiner (2014) considers the effect of introducing social promotion cycles
on the test scores of 4th grade students in state-run schools in the Brazilian state of
Minas Gerais. Comparing early and late adopters of the state social promotion policy,
he finds that the move to social promotion in 2nd and 4th grade decreased test scores.
In contrast to the national average, however, state schools in Minas Gerais had low
baseline repetition rates: 6% in 2000, when the programme was first introduced.
Menezes-Filho et al. (2008) study urban state schools across the country, and estimate
how policy status affected test scores, drop-out and promotion rates in 2005. They
find that drop-out rates decreased, particularly for eighth graders, and that test
scores decreased for eighth graders, but not for fourth graders. Carvalho and Firpo
(2014), in contrast, find that the introduction of cycles had no significant effect on
the test scores of students in grades four and eight across the achievement quantiles.
Interestingly, the authors find that the un-adoption of the cycles policy improved
mathematics scores of fourth grade students across all achievement quantiles, while
it had no effect on eighth grade students’ mathematics scores.
The remainder of paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we provide background
information on the education context of Brazilian primary schools, and describe the
cycles policy in detail. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents our empirical
strategy. Sections 5 present our main results and robustness exercises. Section 6
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discusses the findings, while Section 7 concludes. Additional details on the data
and the cycles policy, as well as robustness exercises around the primary empirical
specifications, are in the Appendix.
2 Background
2.1 Education in Brazil
High-quality education is crucial both for individual success and for a country’s
economic and social development. Deficiencies in both the quantity and the quality
of Brazilian public education have long been seen as an one of the major obstacles
to growth and social inclusion in the country. High age-grade gaps have historically
plagued the Brazilian educational system, and remain particularly predominant in
poor and rural areas.
Although historically an important issue in Brazil, the number of school-age
children out of school had declined rapidly over the past two decades. While in
1992 13.4% of children between the ages of seven and fourteen were out of school,
this number fell to 3.5% in 2001, 2.3% in 2007 and 1.5% in 2013 (PNAD/IBGE).4
Cardoso and Verner (2006) confirm this trend. Reporting on a survey of twelve- to
eighteen-year-olds living in favelas of Fortaleza, the authors find that, even among
this high-risk population, almost all twelve-year-olds attend school. Attendance rates
start to fall at age thirteen for boys (down to 80 percent), while they remain high
4PNAD is the National Household Sample Survey (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de
Domicílios) from the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE-Instituto Brasileiro de
Geografia e Estatística). The survey collects annual data on the characteristics of the population
with a sample size of over 150,000 households.
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among girls until age seventeen. Nationwide a smaller, but still impressive, decline
in the out-of-school rate can be seen among older students compared to primary-
school-aged children. For those between the ages of fifteen and seventeen, the rate
fell from 40.3% in 1992 to 15.8% in 2013 (PNAD/IBGE).
The proportion of students who are too old for the classes they are attending
has also decreased. As can be seen in Table 1, in 1982, 72% of first graders were
too old for that grade. This problem spread over all grades, so that by seventh
grade 80% of students were not at the appropriate grade for their ages. The issue
has been drastically reduced, but it is still important. In 2010, 15% of first graders
and 28% of seventh graders were above the target age for those grades. A number
of policies have contributed to this improvement in educational outcomes, including
the Bolsa conditional cash transfer programs, introduced in the early 2000s. Glewwe
and Kassouf (2012) use data from the Brazilian school census to study the impacts
of Bolsa Escola (later Bolsa Familia) on enrolment, dropout and promotion rates.
They find positive effects of the program on all three indicators.
While enrolment rates and age-grade misalignment have both improved substan-
tially in recent years, they remain significant obstacles to education quality in Brazil.
Both of these problems are linked to the high levels of repetition predominant across
the country. Following the 2012 PISA evaluation, the OECD (2013) noted that rep-
etition rates in Brazil remain among the highest in surveyed countries. While there
was a decline in grade repetition during primary school between the 2003 and 2012
evaluations, repetition rates in secondary school increased over the same period.
Grade repetition has been the object of study in Brazil for many years. Using
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Table 1: Percent of students in a grade not appropriate for their age
Year Grade
1
Grade
2
Grade
3
Grade
4
Grade
5
Grade
6
Grade
7
1982 71.9 76.5 77.2 76.6 76.6 80.2 79.8
1991 59.5 62.6 63.3 62.7 62.7 68.6 67.4
1996 40.0 44.1 46.4 46.6 46.6 53.2 49.2
2006 17.5 24.6 27.5 28.5 28.5 35.5 34.1
2007 18.3 23.7 27.2 28.2 28.2 34.4 32.1
2008 15.3 19.3 20.3 22.2 22.2 27.8 25.8
2009 15.4 21.5 22.5 23.0 23.0 29.5 27.5
2010 14.5 21.4 24.0 24.4 24.4 30.7 28.3
Source: PNAD.
microdata collected by the World Bank from 1981-1985 in Northeast Brazil, Gomes-
Neto and Hanushek (1994) are able to follow individual students over several years.
The authors find that poor academic performance and the absence of higher grades
at a student’s current school are both strong determinants of grade repetition. They
show that students do increase their knowledge when they repeat grades, but suggest
that repetition is a costly way of achieving these small gains. More recently, Koppen-
steiner (2014) finds that the shift towards social promotion cycles in Minas Gerais
was accompanied by a decrease in 4th grade test scores, suggesting that repetition
is indeed promoting student achievement.
2.2 The Cycles Policy
Until the early nineties, Brazilian schools followed the practice of allowing the repe-
tition of students at every grade level. Students could not only repeat in every grade,
but could also be retained several years in a row at the same level. Starting in 1997,
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a number of Brazilian municipalities and states adopted a system of ‘learning cycles’:
groupings of school grades during which promotion is automatic. For example, if the
first 8 years of primary school are grouped into 2 cycles of 4 years, then students will
pass 1st, 2nd and 3rd grade automatically (subject to a minimum attendance rate),
but may repeat the 4th grade. They will also pass the 5th, 6th and 7th grade, but
may be retained in the 8th grade. This policy is called ‘Continued Progression,’5
referred to in this paper as the cycles policy.
This policy of learning cycles was nationally recognised in the Law of Guidelines
and Foundations for Education6 enacted by the Federal Government in 1996. This
law granted additional autonomy to Municipalities and States to organise the school-
ing system. Although municipal schools in São Paulo had experimented with cycles
as early as 1992, the first large-scale adoption of the policy was by the state of São
Paulo in 1997. The Federal District and several of the 26 Brazilian States followed
at various times, including Amazonas, Ceará, Espírito Santo, Mato Grosso, Minas
Gerais, Paraná, Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro and Rondônia.
Adoption of the policy took a number of different forms. While in some states
and municipalities the adoption of cycles was mandatory, in others the system of
cycles was only recommended. Therefore, in some states and municipalities schools
could choose whether to adopt the social promotion system. While many states did
not adopt the policy at all, others adopted it for some years and then retracted it.
We will return to the policy and present some descriptive statistics on its adoption
in Section 3.2.
5Progressão continuada.
6Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação (LDB).
11
3 Data
3.1 Construction of the Panel
The data which provides the starting point of this paper is the Censo Escolar, an
annual census of schools in Brazil below the tertiary level. The survey, carried out
in May, covers both private and public schools, and has been running continuously
since 1995. The data are publicly available from the Instituto Nacional de Estudos
e Pesquisas Educacionais (INEP, the national education research institute). From
1995-2006 the Censo Escolar measured school-level variables, whereas from 2007 on
data is presented at the student level, with associated school and teacher files.7 The
Censo Escolar survey varies from year to year; however the general topics remain
fairly consistent over time. The survey sections include basic information, physical
and instructional features of the school, teachers and staff, numbers of classes and
students, and student flows from the previous year (retained, passed, dropped-out,
and in some years transferred).
For the purposes of our study, we merge the data from the Censo Escolar into
two panels, one at the school level, and one at the municipality level. Each panel
begins with the first data on the cycles policy, in 1999, and runs until 2006. The two
panels are presented individually below.
7School identifiers, as well as student-level identifiers, are encrypted in the publicly-available
data. This encryption prevents the identification of individual schools, but also the linkage of
schools across years.
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3.1.1 School-level Panel
The Censo Escolar surveyed 248,257 schools in 2004. We restrict our attention to
students in grades 1-8,8 and to the schools in which they are enrolled. Exclud-
ing schools which teach only secondary school or pre-school leaves us with 166,505
schools. Of these, 116,209 are under municipal jurisdiction, 31,178 are under state
jurisdiction, 19,078 are private schools, and the remaining 40 are federally-run. Table
2 gives the mean number of schools per municipality across the panel, both overall
and by administrative jurisdiction.
Table 2: Mean number of primary schools per municipality
Year Total Municipal State Private Federal
1999 33.192 23.750 6.208 3.224 0.009
2000 32.838 23.547 6.027 3.256 0.008
2001 31.854 22.711 5.837 3.297 0.008
2002 30.901 21.828 5.724 3.342 0.008
2003 30.282 21.247 5.635 3.393 0.007
2004 29.814 20.905 5.517 3.386 0.007
2005 29.115 20.484 5.239 3.384 0.007
2006 28.449 19.915 5.128 3.399 0.007
Source: Censo Escolar, authors’ calculations. Mean values across municipalities. Municipal, State,
Private and Federal refer to administrative authority of the schools from 1999-2006.
Not all primary schools offer both junior and senior primary classes. Table 3 lists
the mean number of students enrolled in each grade, conditional on enrolment being
8We use the word ‘grade’ as an analog to the Brazilian term serie, with corresponding levels
1-8. During our panel, a new 9-year ano grade-level system began to be rolled out. The extra
year (ano 1 ) essentially advanced primary school enrolment by one year. Throughout this study,
we abstract from any differences in the two systems beyond their duration, and convert the ano
grades (1-9) to their serie equivalent, where ano 2 = serie 1. The grade ano 1 is excluded from
the analysis. We will refer to these school years collectively as ‘primary school’.
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positive. As can be seen in the last column of the table, there are approximately
three times as many schools offering junior primary grades as senior primary grades.
Senior primary schools therefore enrol more students.
Table 3: Mean number of students enrolled per school
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Grade 1 36.045 49.51 1233454
Grade 2 31.226 43.653 1214054
Grade 3 30.159 42.665 1180755
Grade 4 30.31 43.487 1114851
Grade 5 89.472 90.005 418137
Grade 6 81.211 76.407 389640
Grade 7 76.745 74.320 368378
Grade 8 73.184 71.726 347244
Source: Censo Escolar, authors’ calculations. Mean values across municipalities from 1999-2006.
The school level panel is highly unbalanced, due to schools opening, closing or
registering as inactive. A total of 216,429 primary schools appear at least once in
our 8-year panel; 14,227 are only active in a single year, while less than half, 129,942
schools, are present throughout.9 Because our school-level regressions contain fixed
effects, schools which are active only in a single year will drop out of our panel; we
do not make further restrictions and retain the remaining schools for analysis.
3.1.2 Municipality-level Panel
Separately, we aggregate the school-level variables at the municipal level. We ag-
gregate the data by summing the observations across schools. This is done in such
9To relate this number to the example given above, this means that 129,942 of the 166,505
schools active in 2004 were open throughout our panel, while the remainder were open for some
part of the 8 years under study.
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a way that it is as if the municipality had only one school, with all the students
and resources pooled together. Data are then merged to create an 8-year panel with
municipality-years as the unit of observation. The 1999-2006 municipality panel is
highly balanced: compared to 2006, there are 4 fewer municipalities in 2001-2004, and
57 fewer in 1999-2000. We exclude these 57 municipalities from our study, retaining
a final sample of 5507 municipalities.
We augment the municipality panel with census data on municipal population
and gross domestic product from the Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Applicada
(IPEA). Additional data regarding ages of children surveyed in the year-2000 census
were acquired from the Sistema IBGE de Recuperação Automática (SIDRA).10
3.2 Policy Variable
Data on adoption of social promotion cycles are available in the Censo Escolar in
two forms.11 In 1999, and again from 2003 to 2006, the data include individual
schools’ reported “total number of cycles and duration of each cycle”.12 From 2009
onward, schools are simply asked whether or not elementary school is organised in
cycles.13 While the questionnaires from 2000-2002 also contain the cycles module,
10Data come from the section on education, accessed through:
www.sidra.ibge.gov.br/bda/popul.
11Over the course of our panel, there are approximately 30,000 school-year observations which
return a missing policy. A few examples from the data lead us to believe these are either clerical
errors or misunderstandings, and are meant to indicate absence of cycles. One such example is
the state of Minas Gerais where, between 2002 and 2003, the number of schools responding to the
question falls by 61%, while the share of schools adopting cycles rises from 41% to 99%. This
situation persists in 2004, before reverting to pattern much more similar to that observed in 2002.
Coding these missing values as zeros also makes the school-level policy consistent with the municipal
aggregation: weighted share of schools in the municipality reporting using cycles.
12From the 1999 Censo Escolar questionnaire: Número Total de Ciclos e Duração de cada Ciclo.
13From the 2009 Censo Escolar questionnaire: Ensino Fundamental organizado em ciclos.
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the data are absent from the publicly available data files. Cycles data from these
years were provided to us on request; however, these supplementary data are only
yes/no. For the 1999-2006 panel, therefore, we have a consistent binary measure
of cycles adoption, but no consistent details on duration or timing of these cycles:
we therefore restrict ourselves to a binary adoption variable.14 An overview of the
number of cycles used by adopting schools, and of the length of the first cycles, can
be found in Appendix B.2.
Summarising the adoption of cycles policies at the municipal level requires an ag-
gregation which is less natural than that done for school outcomes. We first calculate
the weighted share of schools within a given municipality which report using cycles:
this corresponds to the probability that a randomly selected student is enrolled in
a cycles-using school.15 We then simplify this to a binary variable by defining a
threshold share of adopting schools above which a municipality is coded as adopting
the policy. Our intent here is compare municipalities where a majority of schools
are using cycles to those where this is not the case. The distribution of the share of
schools using cycles within a given municipality is highly bimodal (see Figures 2 and
3 in Appendix B), motivating our use of a binary specification. We therefore define
cycles use in a municipality as equal to one if the share of weighted share of schools
reporting use of a cycles policy is greater than 75%.16
14Menezes-Filho et al. (2008) use the cycles policy variable in a similar way: schools are coded
as having the policy, or not. The authors also offer suggestive evidence that controlling for number
and length of cycles strengthens the estimated effect of the policy, with fewer, longer cycles reducing
drop-out rates.
15Weights are calculated based on each school’s enrolment of students in grades 1-8.
16We also compute a series of alternate thresholds, retained for robustness exercises in Section
C.5. The alternate measures are summarised in Table 35, Appendix B.2.
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The annual means of our policy variable are shown in Table 4, both overall
and for schools operated by each of the two primary public jurisdictions. The fairly
stable mean prevalence of the cycles policy masks substantial volatility in the policy’s
adoption. As can be seen in Table 5, about 5% of municipalities move in or out of
the policy every year: these municipalities go from either almost complete adoption
to abandonment of the policy - or vice versa. A more detailed summary of the
prevalence of the cycles policy across the five regions of Brazil, and how this changes
over time, is given in Appendix B.3.
Table 4: Cycle prevalence: municipality means
Year Overall Municipal State
1999 0.192 0.209 0.421
2000 0.178 0.225 0.372
2001 0.174 0.223 0.376
2002 0.166 0.232 0.370
2003 0.160 0.229 0.356
2004 0.146 0.237 0.334
2005 0.189 0.238 0.406
2006 0.154 0.225 0.328
Source: Censo Escolar, authors’ calculations. Mean values across municipalities. Overall preva-
lence is the binary variable described in Section 3.2, while Municipal and State are equal to 1 in
municipalities where policy adoption in municipality-run or state-run schools, respectively, exceed
the 75% threshold.
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Table 5: Movement in and out of cycle use
Year Change Adopt Unadopt
1999 . [0.238] .
2000 0.071 0.029 0.042
2001 0.048 0.022 0.026
2002 0.043 0.017 0.025
2003 0.035 0.015 0.021
2004 0.057 0.021 0.035
2005 0.075 0.059 0.016
2006 0.063 0.014 0.049
Source: Censo Escolar, authors’ calculations. Mean values across municipalities. Adopt is equal to
1 for municipalities whose binary cycles policy prevalence variable passed from 0 in the previous
year to 1 in the current year (and vice-versa for unadopt). Change is equal to 1 if either adopt or
unadopt are equal to 1. Since no data are available in 1998, the change in policy is not defined for
1999. The adoption figure in square brackets gives the share of municipalities using cycles in 1999.
For further details, see Section 3.2.
Of the 5,507 municipalities in our panel, approximately one fifth (1,179) change
policy status between 1999 and 2006. Given that the parameters of interest will be
identified off these municipalities, it is worth looking at them in some detail before
proceeding.17 Figure 1 shows the location of these municipalities on a map of Brazil.
Consistent with the overall adoption pattern of the policy, none of the municipal-
ities are located in the North or in the South.18 While there is some presence in
the Northeast, the majority of the policy-changing municipalities are located in the
Southeast and the Centre-West. Within these two areas, the distribution of these
municipalities does not display any obvious geographical pattern.
Table 6 presents some descriptive statistics comparing municipalities that have a
17Not all adopting municipalities are counted in this 1179. Of the 4,328 municipalities who do
not change policy status, 405 use social promotion.
18Given the density of municipalities in the South region, this is difficult to detect in Figure 1.
For further details, see Appendix B.
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policy change with those which do not. Municipalities with a policy change are on
average slightly smaller, have higher municipal GDP per capita, have fewer municipal
schools, fewer primary school teachers, and had a lower repetition rate in 1995.
Table 6: Comparison of municipalities with a policy change to those with-
out
Pop GDP Schools Teachers 95 Rep
Municipal State Private
change=0 3.1e+04 4.021 1.705 0.337 0.051 11.341 0.185
(2.0e+05) (4.378) (1.517) (0.429) (0.076) (3.132) (0.119)
change=1 3.1e+04 4.719 0.986 0.304 0.047 10.709 0.121
(1.2e+05) (5.264) (0.912) (0.297) (0.069) (2.959) (0.120)
Source: Censo Escolar (2001, 1995) and INEP, authors’ calculations. Mean values across munici-
palities; standard deviations in parentheses. Pop is population; GDP is per capita in yr-2000 Real;
schools and teachers are counted per thousand capita, grades 1-8 only; 95 Rep is the repetition rate
in 1995.
3.3 Outcome Variables
Our primary outcome measures are enrolment, grade attainment of those who are
enrolled, and flows of students from one year to the next. The definition of these
variables, and some summary statistics, are presented below.
3.3.1 Enrolment
We follow Glewwe and Kassouf (2012) by using the natural logarithm of student
numbers as our primary measure of enrolment. Table 7 presents summary statistics
of school-level age-specific enrolments, in levels and in natural logs. We maintain
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Figure 1: Location of municipalities with a change in policy status
Source: authors’ calculations, using municipality shapefile from IBGE and policy data from the
Censo Escolar.
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two other measures of enrolment for comparison: enrolment in levels, and enrolment
as a share of relevant age category from the 2000 census (see Appendix C).
Table 7: School-level mean enrolments: levels and natural logarith
Level Std. Dev. Ln Std. Dev. N
Age 6 6.645 12.833 1.19 1.066 474989
Age 7 18.628 28.59 2.108 1.285 1147125
Age 8 22.546 34.779 2.262 1.318 1208863
Age 9 22.651 34.84 2.258 1.327 1221614
Age 10 22.29 34.585 2.217 1.346 1253105
Age 11 22.394 32.961 2.213 1.383 1251465
Age 12 23.948 38.664 2.142 1.47 1017822
Source: Censo Escolar, authors’ calculations. Mean values across schools, conditional on positive
enrolment at that age level, from 1999-2006.
3.3.2 Passing, Repetition and Drop-out
Each wave of the Censo Escolar collects data on the student flows from the previous
year. Specifically, schools are asked to report how many students from each grade
repeated or were promoted at the end of the year, and how many dropped out before
the end of the year.19 In order to convert these student counts into rates, we divide
the counts by the number of students enrolled in each grade, reported in the Censo
Escolar of the previous year.
Table 8 gives school-average repetition, pass and dropout rates, both overall and
by policy status, averaged across the years of our panel. Note that the difference
in repetition rates between schools which have adopted the cycles policy and those
19In some waves there are additional categories: conditional or unconditional pass, transferred
out of the school, joined the school part-way through the year, etc. We focus on these three because
they are both the most interesting to us, and those which are most consistently measured across
years.
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that have not varies considerably across grade levels. The equivalent table at the
municipal level (see Table 9) presents a similar picture: if anything, the differences
between repetition rates and drop-out in adopting and non-adopting municipalities
are larger than the inter-school differences. The variation over time for a subset of
these statistics is presented in Appendix A.2 (see Table 28).
Table 8: School-level student flows by policy status
Cycles Gr. 1 Gr. 2 Gr. 3 Gr. 4 Gr. 5 Gr. 6 Gr. 7 Gr. 8
Repeat 0.19 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.07
No 0.22 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.06
Yes 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.08
Pass 0.70 0.77 0.80 0.83 0.77 0.81 0.82 0.85
No 0.67 0.76 0.79 0.83 0.77 0.80 0.82 0.86
Yes 0.86 0.82 0.88 0.86 0.79 0.82 0.81 0.84
Drop 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08
No 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08
Yes 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.10
Source: Censo Escolar, authors’ calculations. Mean values across schools from 1999-2005.
Table 9: Municipality-level student flows by policy status
Cycles Gr. 1 Gr. 2 Gr. 3 Gr. 4 Gr. 5 Gr. 6 Gr. 7 Gr. 8
Repeat 0.16 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.07
No 0.18 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.07
Yes 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.08
Pass 0.73 0.77 0.81 0.82 0.73 0.77 0.79 0.82
No 0.70 0.75 0.79 0.81 0.71 0.76 0.78 0.82
Yes 0.88 0.86 0.90 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.82
Drop 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10
No 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.11
Yes 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09
Source: Censo Escolar, authors’ calculations. Mean values across municipalities from 1999-2005.
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3.3.3 Grade Delay
Measuring grade attainment presents one major limitation: grade information is
available only for those students enrolled in school. Since students who are not
enrolled are likely to be lower-achieving than those who are, our estimates of grade
attainment should be thought of as an upper bound. The fact that most children
of primary school age are enrolled in school at this time attenuates this issue. We
measure grade attainment as the share of students who are delayed in their studies.
We define grade delay in a strict sense by coding a student as delayed if she is older
than the target age for the grade she is in. By this strict definition, an eight-year-old
studying in grade one would be classified as delayed. We also calculate a less strict
measure, allowing a year of tolerance: an eight-year-old studying in grade one is not
considered delayed by this measure, but a nine-year-old in grade one is.20
Table 10 presents the annual grade attainment of a single birth-cohort of students,
illustrating the early onset and large extent of primary school grade delay. The table
shows municipal mean enrolment numbers and grade level of children born in 1994,
from 2000 (when the children were six years old) to 2006 (when they were twelve).21
Children are deemed to be “on time” with their studies if they are in grade one when
they are seven years old, in grade two when they are eight, and so on. The “on time”
students are highlighted in bold in Table 10; those to the left of the bold figure are
20We also compute the average grade of a birth cohort, see Appendix C.3.2.
21We restrict our analysis to students six to twelve years old who are enrolled in grades that are
no more than two years ahead of the age-appropriate level. Data are available on children ‘younger
than six’ enrolled in grade 1, but we omit these (very few) individuals because we cannot precisely
determine their age. Prior to 2003, student ages were not reported for ages younger than two years
below the age-appropriate grade level (e.g. number of six-year-olds is reported in grades 1 and 2,
but not in higher grades). From 2003-2006 we maintain this truncation for consistency.
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delayed, while those to the right are advanced for their age.
Table 10: Annual enrolment and grade of 1994-born cohort
Year Gr. 1 Gr. 2 Gr. 3 Gr. 4 Gr. 5 Gr. 6 Gr. 7 Gr. 8
2000 82.38 1.78 . . . . . .
2001 456.16 34.49 1.61 . . . . .
2002 241.65 345.12 29.45 1.63 . . . .
2003 73.68 219.17 308.06 28.21 1.45 . . .
2004 32.29 83.73 196.34 289.20 26.43 1.40 . .
2005 17.38 42.56 80.24 187.87 273.99 25.10 1.35 .
2006 8.59 23.43 45.30 83.15 193.66 247.70 21.53 1.41
Source: Censo Escolar, authors’ calculations. Mean values across municipalities.
Finally, we generate a ‘placebo’ measure of grade attainment which should not to
be affected by social promotion: the share of a cohort studying at a grade level above
the target for their age. These students, who were either enrolled early or skipped a
grade during their studies, are presumably among the top of the ability distribution
for their cohort. There is no reason to expect the number of these students to be
affected by social promotion, as they were unlikely to be at risk of repeating a grade
in the first place. Table 11 gives an overview of student delays, averaged over the
course of our panel.
4 Estimation Strategy
4.1 Estimating Equation
Our interest in this paper lies in identifying the effect of the cycles policy on students’
progress through school. We measure progress with four outcome variables: two
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Table 11: Share of cohort with grade delay
1 Year 2 Years Advanced
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age 8 0.398 0.203 0 0 0.058 0.076
Age 9 0.495 0.212 0.159 0.150 0.049 0.069
Age 10 0.548 0.218 0.251 0.197 0.040 0.062
Age 11 0.600 0.217 0.316 0.226 0.033 0.055
Age 12 0.642 0.205 0.358 0.233 0.028 0.045
Source: Censo Escolar, authors’ calculations. Mean values across municipalities from 1999-2006.
Delay defined as number of years behind the target of first grade at age seven.
student flows (repetition and mid-year dropout), total enrolment and age-grade delay.
Student flows are only observed at the grade level, and are measured as the share of
initial enrolment in a given grade. Enrolment and grade level are observed by age as
well as by grade. We estimate the effect of social promotion on these measures by
age, as this measure is robust to changes in grade composition induced by the policy.
A first approach to the problem would be to estimate equations of the form:
Y τit = α + βDit +X
′
itγ + θi + it, (1)
where Y τit is the outcome of interest in unit i at time t for students τ (with τ
representing either the grade-level or age group, as appropriate); Dit is a dummy
for the policy; Xit is a vector of time-varying characteristics at the unit level; θi is
the unit fixed effect and it is the unobserved error term. Y τit will be, for instance,
the repetition rate of 3rd grade students in municipality i, or the total enrolment of
ten-year-olds in school i. In each case we are interested in estimating the coefficient
β: the effect of exposure to the policy in the current year on the outcome under
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consideration.
While there is movement in and out of the policy every year, the adoption of
cycles is highly persistent year-to-year (see Table 5). It is unlikely that the history of
the policy in a given school or municipality will be too important for young students
enrolling in school for the first time.22 For older students, however, who have been
in school for several years, past exposure to the policy could affect their progress
through school today. Given the persistence of the policy, if we fail to control for
this past exposure we run the risk of overestimating the effect of the policy in the
current year: students exposed today were likely also exposed last year.
As a second approach, we therefore estimate an analog of Equation 1 including
lagged values of the policy. For outcomes by grade, we select the number of lags
in order to coincide with the years students would have been in school, had they
been progressing at the target rate.23 For instance, for the outcomes of grade two
students, we include the current and lagged value of the policy, while for grade three
students an additional lag is added. When considering outcomes by age, where early
enrolment is potentially a result of interest, we include lagged values of the policy
back to age six. Since we are constrained in the number of years for which we have
data on the cycles policy, we include a maximum of five lagged values of the policy
at the upper grades and ages.24
22There could of course be some impacts: the school could be better adjusted to the policy if
they have had it for several years, or students may enrol earlier or later as a result of the policy.
23This approach does not, unfortunately, include all years that all students in the group in
question have been at school: if a student in second grade repeated last year, he is currently in his
third year of school and therefore one year of his policy history is not controlled for. On the other
hand, including additional lags decreases the number of years on which our data can be estimated.
We adopt this approach as a compromise between the two.
24We limit our age-based analysis to students aged seven to twelve, with the constraint binding
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This second approach can be summarised in the following equation, where Di is
a vector containing both current and past policy dummies:
Y τit = α +D
′
iβ +X
′
itγ + θi + it. (2)
More explicitly, taking as example an outcome which we examine by age, we
estimate the series of equations given in (3) below.
Y 7it = α + β
7
0Dit + β
7
1Dit−1 +X
′
itγ + θi + it
Y 8it = α + β
8
0Dit + β
8
1Dit−1 + β
8
2Dit−2 +X
′
itγ + θi + it
Y 9it = α + β
9
0Dit + β
9
1Dit−1 + β
9
2Dit−2 + β
9
3Dit−3 +X
′
itγ + θi + it (3)
Y 10it = α + β
10
0 Dit + β
10
1 Dit−1 + β
10
2 Dit−2 + β
10
3 Dit−3 + β
10
4 Dit−4 +X
′
itγ + θi + it
Y 11it = α + β
11
0 Dit + β
11
1 Dit−1 + β
11
2 Dit−2 + β
11
3 Dit−3 + β
11
4 Dit−4 + β
11
5 Dit−5 +X
′
itγ + θi + it
Y 12it = α + β
12
0 Dit + β
12
1 Dit−1 + β
12
2 Dit−2 + β
12
3 Dit−3 + β
12
4 Dit−4 + β
12
5 Dit−5 +X
′
itγ + θi + it
The coefficients of interest, the βˆτ0 ...βˆτ5 , provide estimates of the effect of current
and past exposure to the policy.
4.2 Unit of Analysis
Our finest unit of observation, both for our outcome variables and for the policy itself,
is at the level of the school. The identifying assumption for school-level regressions
only for twelve-year-olds. Since we look at grade-specific outcomes up to grade eight, this limit is
hit for most of upper primary school.
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is that there are no unobserved, time-varying factors at the school level that are
correlated both with policy adoption and with the outcomes we measure. Given that
our student outcomes are measured only on those students enrolled, the possibility
of students choosing their school based on the policy is a real concern.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that parents were displeased with the policy, and
were concerned that students would under-perform if they did not face the threat
of repetition. To the extent that this is true, more motivated parents may shift
their children to schools which have not adopted the policy – possibly even sending
their children to private schools to achieve this. Such a trend would be consistent
with evidence from the United States, where Dong (2010) finds significant positive
selection into schools with repetition in kindergarten.
In Section 5.1 below, we demonstrate that this concern is well-founded: while
there is no net change in enrolment in municipalities which adopt the policy, indi-
vidual schools that implement social promotion see substantial changes in student
numbers. The altered student composition which results from such movements makes
it impossible to interpret any associated changes in student performance as resulting
solely from the introduction of social promotion.
Aggregating our data at the municipality level allows us to address this issue.
Moving children to schools in a different municipality would be extremely costly for
most families. While those living on a municipal boundary may do so in response
to the policy, it is unlikely that this practice would be widespread. The identi-
fying assumption at the municipality level is that changes in policy adoption are
uncorrelated with any time-varying unobserved municipal characteristics which are,
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in turn, correlated with our outcome variables. While we cannot test this assump-
tion directly, in Appendix B.1 we estimate policy adoption using both our baseline
time-varying controls, and some time-invariant characteristics interacted with year.
While some of our included controls do correlate with policy adoption (particularly,
education level of upper primary school teachers), we find no systematic relation
between social promotion policies and time-interacted political affiliation (mayor’s
party aligned with presidents, or mayor and governor being from the same party) or
pre-policy repetition rates.
Two limitations of our municipal policy variable are worth raising before we turn
to the results. First, it is a noisy aggregation. There may be some schools in
the municipality who do not adopt cycles, even if the municipality is coded as an
adopter. These non-adopters are unlikely to be randomly drawn. Private schools,
for instance, rarely implement social promotion cycles. Similarly, public schools who
defy the municipal norm are likely to have special characteristics. Second, adopting
a policy of social promotion cycles does not mean promoting students automatically
in each grade. As described in Section 2.2, some grades were commonly included in
cycles, while promotion from others were rarely – if ever – accorded automatically.
Both of these issues introduce measurement error into our policy variable. We
expect the first to dilute any effect of the policy, as some schools are opting out, and
bias our coefficient estimates towards zero. The second prevents us from interpreting
the effect of the policy as the impact of social promotion at any specific grade level
(with the possible exception of grade 1). Our policy variable indicates that the vast
majority of schools within the municipality were implementing social promotion at
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some grade levels. Although we will look at the effect this has on students across
all primary school grades, only a fraction of these students will be directly effected
in the current year. Any measured effect of policy status on grade seven students
will therefore be the average effect across grade seven students at schools that were
implementing social promotion in grade seven that year, and across those at schools
that were implementing social promotion that year in some grades, but not in grade
seven. Assuming that the effect of the policy will be strongest when it promises
social promotion for the student group in question, this will also bias our coefficient
estimates towards zero.25
5 Results
The following subsections present results from regressions described in Equations 1
and 2. All regressions include fixed effects (at either the school or municipality level),
state-year interaction dummies, and a collection of time-varying controls. For school-
level regressions, these controls include: a dummy for location26 (rural or urban),
a dummy for jurisdiction (state, municipal or private), total number of teachers,
and number of teachers at the primary level. Standard errors are clustered at the
level of the fixed effect.27 For regressions using students aggregated by grade, the
number and education of teachers teaching either grades 1-4 or 5-8 are also included.
25The policy may well impact students who are not in cycle grades as well. For instance, a
student may feel she has a greater incentive to work this year if the next grade is inside a cycle.
26Approximately 2% of schools experience a location status change during the panel. It is not
clear whether the schools themselves moved, the surrounding area developed, or if these are clerical
errors.
27See, for example, Cameron and Miller (2015).
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The additional controls included in municipal regressions are similar: the number
of schools in the municipality, the number of schools by location and jurisdiction,
population and municipal GDP in natural logs and in levels, and the number and
education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and 5-8.28 Summary statistics for
controls at the school and municipal levels can be found in Appendix A.3 (see Tables
29 and 30).
5.1 Enrolment
Tables 12 to 15 present series of regressions with the natural log of total enrolment at
each age as the dependant variable. Tables 12 and 13 present estimates of Equation 1:
the effect of this year’s promotion policy on enrolment, ignoring past policies. Results
at the school level (Table 12) suggest that, while the adoption of social promotion
does not affect the enrolment of seven- or eight-year-olds, it increases the numbers of
nine- and ten-year-olds significantly, while lowering the number of twelve-year-olds.
Results at the municipal level (Table 13), in contrast, show no significant effects of
social promotion on enrolment at any age.29
Tables 14 and 15 present estimates of Equation 2, augmenting the previous re-
gressions with lagged policy values. A similar contrast emerges in these augmented
regressions as was previously observed in Tables 12 and 13: while Table 15 suggest
that municipal enrolment is impervious to past and present promotion polices, Table
28Given that the qualification level and number of teachers could potentially be endogenous to
the chosen promotion policy, we also replicate our main results omitting teacher controls. This
omission does not significantly change our results (see Appendix C, Table 44).
29These regressions are replicated using levels rather than natural logs in Section C.1: see Tables
38 and 37.
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14 reveals substantial movement of students across schools in response to the pol-
icy. These movements display a trend consistent with that displayed in Table 12:
enrolment of young students increases with both current and past use of social pro-
motion, while enrolment of twelve-year-olds decreases.30 One possible explanation
for this sorting pattern would be if families whose children progress through to higher
grades are more averse to the cycles policy, while families of children who struggle
at school view the policy - and schools that adopt it - more favorably.
Table 12: Schools: log total enrolments (no lags)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 7 Age 8 Age 9 Age 10 Age 11 Age 12
Cycles 0.00546 0.00431 0.0132∗∗∗ 0.0466∗∗∗ 0.000598 -0.0190∗∗∗
(0.00365) (0.00297) (0.00304) (0.00351) (0.00290) (0.00318)
Observations1147125 1208863 1221614 1253105 1251465 1017822
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. Each column presents results from a fixed
effect school-level regression. Controls (not shown): dummy for location (rural or urban), a dummy
for jurisdiction (state, municipal or private), total number of teachers, number of teachers at the
primary level and state-year interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Where are these students coming from, and where are they going? In Table 16, we
estimate the effect of municipal promotion policies on the number of students enrolled
in private schools, conditional on that municipality having a positive enrolment in
private school in that year. Adoption of a social promotion policy is associated with
a reduction in the number of students enrolled in private school at all ages, with that
30Particular caution is necessary when interpreting age-specific school-level results. Because not
all schools teach all grades, the interpretation of the coefficients on the vector of lagged policy values
must be carefully considered, particularly at higher grades. While we know the history of policy
adoption for all schools, students who enrol at a senior primary school for the first time in grade
5 have not been affected by the policy history at that school; the history of promotion policies at
those schools are therefore unlikely to have affected them significantly.
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Table 13: Municipalities: log total enrolments (no lags)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 7 Age 8 Age 9 Age 10 Age 11 Age 12
Cycles -0.00729 0.00368 -0.00100 0.00141 -0.00475 -0.00434
(0.00779) (0.00372) (0.00410) (0.00345) (0.00319) (0.00356)
Observations44009 44027 44027 44027 44027 38531
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Each column presents results from a
fixed effect municipality-level regression. Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the
municipality, the number of schools by location and jurisdiction, population and municipal GDP
in natural logs and in levels, the number and education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and
5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 14: Schools: log total enrolments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 7 Age 8 Age 9 Age 10 Age 11 Age 12
Cycles 0.0000795 0.00102 0.00792∗∗ 0.0235∗∗∗ 0.00633 -0.0177∗∗∗
(0.00411) (0.00361) (0.00399) (0.00490) (0.00579) (0.00566)
L.Cycles -0.00512 0.00876∗∗ 0.00548 0.0147∗∗∗ -0.0138∗∗∗ -0.0156∗∗∗
(0.00376) (0.00353) (0.00394) (0.00486) (0.00525) (0.00517)
L2.Cycles 0.00601∗ 0.00857∗∗ 0.0150∗∗∗ 0.00430 -0.0133∗∗
(0.00334) (0.00391) (0.00487) (0.00557) (0.00541)
L3.Cycles 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0134∗∗∗ -0.00928 -0.0217∗∗∗
(0.00370) (0.00490) (0.00617) (0.00618)
L4.Cycles 0.00758∗ 0.000402 -0.0138∗∗
(0.00442) (0.00560) (0.00577)
L5.Cycles -0.00286 0.00103
(0.00507) (0.00524)
Observations960116 831636 675264 539830 390857 366025
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. Each column presents results from a fixed
effect school-level regression. Controls (not shown): dummy for location (rural or urban), a dummy
for jurisdiction (state, municipal or private), total number of teachers, number of teachers at the
primary level and state-year interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 15: Municipalities: log total enrolments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 7 Age 8 Age 9 Age 10 Age 11 Age 12
Cycles -0.00586 0.00441 0.00428 0.00186 -0.0183∗∗∗ -0.00226
(0.00870) (0.00425) (0.00602) (0.00537) (0.00620) (0.00597)
L.Cycles -0.00822 -0.00129 -0.00746 0.0000786 -0.00308 -0.0119∗
(0.00852) (0.00422) (0.00550) (0.00556) (0.00635) (0.00642)
L2.Cycles 0.00374 -0.00587 0.00221 0.00601 0.00303
(0.00537) (0.00657) (0.00595) (0.00765) (0.00675)
L3.Cycles 0.00443 -0.00104 0.0100 -0.00158
(0.00499) (0.00647) (0.00739) (0.00687)
L4.Cycles -0.00356 0.0101 -
0.0000293
(0.00528) (0.00685) (0.00605)
L5.Cycles -0.00349 0.00156
(0.00591) (0.00526)
Observations38513 33029 27526 22021 16519 16519
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Each column presents results from a
fixed effect municipality-level regression. Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the
municipality, the number of schools by location and jurisdiction, population and municipal GDP
in natural logs and in levels, the number and education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and
5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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reduction being substantial and statistically significant at all ages except seven (the
first year of primary school) and ten (the year in which on-time students complete
junior primary school). This finding contrasts with anecdotal evidence that social
promotion policy was unpopular with parents: the widespread adoption of social
promotion among a municipality’s public schools results in a shift away from gated-
promotion private schools. It should be noted that these are net effects: no doubt
some parents did shift their children into private schooling in response to the policy.
The net effect is dominated by other parents, possibly those with children struggling
to meet passing requirements in their private school, who moved their children into
the public system.31
Table 16: Change in log private school enrolment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 7 Age 8 Age 9 Age 10 Age 11 Age 12
Cycles -0.0239 -0.0364∗∗ -0.0389∗∗ -0.0242 -0.0669∗∗∗ -0.0500∗∗∗
(0.0178) (0.0177) (0.0180) (0.0178) (0.0206) (0.0193)
Observations18759 18757 18585 18424 17821 16678
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Each column presents results from a
fixed effect municipality-level regression, where the natural log of private school enrolment numbers
is the dependant variable. Only municipality-years with a positive enrolment number are included.
Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the municipality, the number of schools by location
and jurisdiction, population and municipal GDP in natural logs and in levels, the number and
education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and 5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
A comparison of these municipal and school results suggests that students are
indeed relocating across schools in response to the policy. While municipalities who
adopt the policy display no change in enrolment, individual schools do. This finding,
31We also estimate the impact of municipal promotion policies on the share of private school
students who are delayed. The overall effect is small and statistically insignificant.
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while interesting in itself, makes us wary of pursuing any school-level analysis of
student outcomes. Given the magnitude of student movements shown in Table 14, the
composition of the student body at policy-adopting schools may evolve substantially
following the implementation of social promotion. Assuming those students who
select away from grade repetition have different average characteristics from those
who do not, any analysis of school-level outcomes could be heavily biased. In the
sections that follow we will present only municipal-level results, unless otherwise
noted and justified.
Given the potentially enduring effects of social promotion on the grade level,
subject mastery and motivation of students, it is likely that the promotion policies
students have faced in the past will affect their current school experience in a num-
ber of ways. Furthermore, as promotion policies are highly persistent from year to
year, current policy status will be strongly correlated with past policies, biasing the
estimates of current promotion policies when past policies are not controlled for. A
comparison of Tables 12 and 14 substantiates this concern. While the estimated ef-
fect of contemporary promotion policies on enrolment displays a similar trend across
the two tables, point estimates are substantially smaller (and standard errors gener-
ally larger) when policies are controlled for. Due to this, and to our direct interest
in estimating the persistence of any effects over time, we will limit ourselves in the
following sections to estimating Equation 2.
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5.2 Student Flows
Since the flows themselves affect the composition of each grade, lagged values of the
policy are more delicate to interpret in grade-specific regressions than in age-specific
regressions. Given the compositional effects of grade repetition, we cannot interpret
the coefficient on the lagged policy variable as the effect of exposure to the policy for
students when they were in the previous grade. Rather, these coefficients capture
the average effect of exposure to the policy last year for students who are currently
in enrolled in a given grade. This prevents us from using our estimates to compare
the long-term impact of exposure to the policy at different grades.
5.2.1 Repetition Rate
Table 17 presents results from a series of municipal-level estimates of Equation 2
with grade-specific repetition rate as the dependant variable. This table gives us an
indication of how the cycles policy was implemented. Contemporary social promotion
policies decrease repetition rates in grades one, two and three, but not in grade four: a
grade which is excluded from social promotion cycles (see Table 34 in Appendix B.2).
Repetition rates are again lowered in grade five, with little effect thereafter besides
some evidence for an increase in grade eight. The largest effect of the policy is seen in
grade one, a grade which would almost universally be included in a social promotion
cycle: municipalities which implement the policy retain 5 percentage points fewer
first grade students than those which have no such policy in place. The policy
coefficient in grades two, three and five is smaller, at around 2 percentage points.
This could be due both to baseline repetition rates being lower in those grades, and
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to the fact that not all social promotion policies would include those grades within
a cycle.
The last five rows of Table 17 present the effect of lagged exposure to the policy on
repetition rates at given grades. While we hesitate to interpret individual coefficients,
several are of particular interest. First, the second row of Column 2 indicates that
social promotion in first grade does raise grade two repetition rates the following year.
Given that many promotion cycles would have ended in second grade, with socially
promoted students facing the threat of retention for the first time, this positive
coefficient is expected. The small magnitude of this effect, which is one tenth the
size of the initial boost in promotion, is somewhat surprising. Secondly, it is worth
noting the effect of policy history on repetition rates in grade four (Column 4).
Grade four is of particular interest due to it being the threshold year for entrance
into senior primary school. If past exposure to social promotion resulted in a spike
in repetition rates in that grade, we would be concerned that the attainment gains
from the policy are largely mechanical: students pushed ahead by the policy simply
fail at the earliest opportunity. We see some evidence for this in row 3, with exposure
to the policy two years ago increasing the risk of repeating grade four; however, the
magnitude of this effect is small.
5.2.2 Drop-out Rate
Results from equivalent estimates with drop-out rates as the dependant variables are
presented in Table 18. Despite the large decrease in repetition rates, municipal-wide
adoption of social promotion cycles has almost no effect on mid-year drop-out rates.
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The one exception is in first grade, where exposure to the policy decreases dropout
rates by about 0.3 of a percentage point. Given that grade one students drop out
at an average rate of 11% across our sample (see Table 9), this is a small but not
insignificant change.
The general absence of a significant change in dropouts contrast with previous
research: across a diversity of context, researchers have found a positive association
between repetition and drop out rates.32 As Allensworth (2005) demonstrates, how-
ever, the effects of repetition on dropout can vary dramatically between repeaters
and non-repeaters, and the absence of an overall effect can dissimulate compensating
changes in these two groups. If students are promoted ahead of their abilities, they
may face a discouraging mismatch between their abilities and the course material.33
If this mismatch is severe, students may feel hopeless and dropout. On the other
hand, repetition itself can be discouraging, and precipitate school-leaving. Given
that social promotion could theoretically affect promoted students in either direc-
tion, we cannot draw firm conclusions. It is noteworthy, however, that there was in
fact no overall effect: the observed gains in grade attainment were achieved without
driving students more out of the classroom.
32See Allensworth (2005), André (2009), Glick and Sahn (2010) and Manacorda (2012).
33See, for instance, Pritchett and Beatty (2012) on learning profiles.
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Table 17: Municipality student flows: repeated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 7 Grade 8
Cycles -0.0500∗∗∗ -0.0171∗∗∗ -0.0214∗∗∗ -0.00300 -0.0215∗∗∗ 0.00429 -0.00164 0.00834∗
(0.00279) (0.00236) (0.00229) (0.00235) (0.00358) (0.00443) (0.00403) (0.00456)
L.Cycles 0.00498∗∗ -
0.00528∗∗∗
-0.000611 -0.00717∗∗ 0.00751 0.000389 0.0215∗∗∗
(0.00221) (0.00193) (0.00256) (0.00314) (0.00480) (0.00430) (0.00536)
L2.Cycles 0.00654∗∗∗ 0.00662∗∗∗ 0.00365 -0.000487 0.00293 0.00468
(0.00208) (0.00231) (0.00364) (0.00553) (0.00549) (0.00574)
L3.Cycles 0.00320 0.00547∗ 0.000682 0.00788∗ 0.00721
(0.00211) (0.00313) (0.00496) (0.00470) (0.00551)
L4.Cycles 0.0131∗∗∗ -0.000305 0.00160 0.000209
(0.00336) (0.00469) (0.00449) (0.00481)
L5.Cycles -0.00416 -0.00601∗ -0.00885∗∗
(0.00378) (0.00345) (0.00404)
Observations38515 33016 27519 22017 16514 11011 11011 11011
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Each column presents results from a fixed effect municipality-level
regression. Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the municipality, the number of schools by location and jurisdiction,
population and municipal GDP in natural logs and in levels, the number and education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4
and 5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 18: Municipality student flows: dropped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 7 Grade 8
Cycles -0.00276∗ -0.000335 0.000579 -0.000926 -0.000963 -0.00183 -0.000913 0.000611
(0.00146) (0.00132) (0.00141) (0.00106) (0.00223) (0.00312) (0.00320) (0.00368)
L.Cycles 0.000370 -0.00165 -0.000926 -0.00296 -0.00337 -0.00153 0.000288
(0.00116) (0.00120) (0.000961) (0.00232) (0.00381) (0.00374) (0.00412)
L2.Cycles -0.000113 -
0.0000795
-0.00244 -0.00487 0.00500 0.00663
(0.00126) (0.00128) (0.00262) (0.00482) (0.00406) (0.00504)
L3.Cycles -0.00165 0.00161 -0.000789 0.00133 -0.00362
(0.00112) (0.00256) (0.00384) (0.00430) (0.00450)
L4.Cycles 0.00137 0.000335 0.00123 -0.00125
(0.00220) (0.00363) (0.00397) (0.00376)
L5.Cycles 0.00636∗∗ 0.00443 -0.00172
(0.00276) (0.00301) (0.00336)
Observations38515 33016 27519 22017 16514 11011 11011 11011
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Each column presents results from a fixed effect municipality-level
regression. Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the municipality, the number of schools by location and jurisdiction,
population and municipal GDP in natural logs and in levels, the number and education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4
and 5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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5.3 Grade Attainment
Table 19 presents results from a series of age-specific regressions where the dependent
variable is the share of the enrolled cohort delayed by one or more grades. Seven-
year-olds are excluded from the sample since, as grade one is the target grade for
seven year olds, it is not possible for them to be both enrolled in school and delayed,
according to our measures. Across the age range we study, past and present exposure
to the social promotion policy has a substantial and significant negative effect on
the share of the cohort delayed in their studies. The effect of the policy is strikingly
consistent and persistent: each year of exposure reduces the share of delayed students
by a little more than 1%, on average, with higher values for the youngest children.
Significantly, the size of this decrease does not decay substantially with time, and
cumulates with further exposure to the policy.
Table 20 replicates these findings using a looser measure, where students are
considered delayed only if they are two or more years behind the target grade for
their age. A very similar pattern emerges, with only slightly smaller effect sizes, as
that in Table 19. The similar size of the estimates across the two measures of delay
is noteworthy, as it suggests that the biggest gains from social promotion accrue to
students who would otherwise have been retained twice. This points to a subset of
the student population for whom repetition is particularly damaging: once retained,
they are likely to be retained again. If pushed ahead, however, they stay ahead.34
34As a placebo test, we also regress the policy variable on a measure which should be unrelated:
the share of a cohort studying ahead of their age level. We find no systematic effects of the policy
on this measure (see Table 40 in Appendix C.3.1)
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Table 19: Municipalities: share of age group delayed one or more grades
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 8 Age 9 Age 10 Age 11 Age 12
Cycles -0.0225∗∗∗ -0.0163∗∗∗ -0.0160∗∗∗ -0.0132∗∗∗ -0.00327
(0.00389) (0.00379) (0.00329) (0.00347) (0.00354)
L.Cycles -0.0237∗∗∗ -0.0114∗∗∗ -0.0135∗∗∗ -0.0104∗∗∗ -0.0114∗∗∗
(0.00378) (0.00370) (0.00333) (0.00383) (0.00362)
L2.Cycles -0.0104∗∗∗ -0.0161∗∗∗ -0.0149∗∗∗ -0.00751∗ -0.00421
(0.00367) (0.00408) (0.00357) (0.00447) (0.00429)
L3.Cycles -0.00619∗ -0.00811∗∗ -0.0124∗∗∗ -0.0108∗∗
(0.00344) (0.00352) (0.00450) (0.00465)
L4.Cycles -0.00528 -0.0128∗∗∗ -0.00948∗∗
(0.00333) (0.00435) (0.00416)
L5.Cycles -0.00238 -0.00319
(0.00396) (0.00363)
Observations 33029 27526 22021 16519 16519
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Each column presents results from a
fixed effect municipality-level regression. Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the
municipality, the number of schools by location and jurisdiction, population and municipal GDP
in natural logs and in levels, the number and education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and
5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 20: Municipalities: share of age group delayed two or more grades
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 9 Age 10 Age 11 Age 12
Cycles -0.0135∗∗∗ -0.0114∗∗∗ -0.0138∗∗∗ -0.00570∗∗
(0.00193) (0.00201) (0.00291) (0.00277)
L.Cycles -0.0168∗∗∗ -0.00991∗∗∗ -0.0145∗∗∗ -0.0121∗∗∗
(0.00194) (0.00208) (0.00310) (0.00282)
L2.Cycles -0.0131∗∗∗ -0.0110∗∗∗ -0.0145∗∗∗ -0.0105∗∗∗
(0.00183) (0.00230) (0.00351) (0.00288)
L3.Cycles -0.00137 -0.00460∗∗ -0.00908∗∗∗ -0.00513∗
(0.00186) (0.00214) (0.00326) (0.00289)
L4.Cycles -0.00115 -0.00498 -0.00275
(0.00203) (0.00319) (0.00281)
L5.Cycles -0.00177 -0.00198
(0.00280) (0.00259)
Observations 27526 22021 16519 16519
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Each column presents results from a
fixed effect municipality-level regression. Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the
municipality, the number of schools by location and jurisdiction, population and municipal GDP
in natural logs and in levels, the number and education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and
5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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6 Extentions
The substantial effects of social promotion on grade progression the most striking
findings of the paper. Not only are the effects non-trivial, they are also both sustained
and cumulative. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first evidence on the
medium-term effect of introducing social promotion, and it is decidedly positive.
Cohorts exposed to social promotion, despite facing the threat of repetition later in
their schooling, have permanently higher grade attainment through to the end of
primary school. The fact that we find no evidence for increases in drop-out rates or
decreases in enrolment due to the policy suggests that these figures are not simply
inflated by artificially promoted students quitting at higher rates than their better-
performing peers.
6.1 Heterogeneity of Impact
Which municipalities are responding most to the policy? Many municipal charac-
teristics of interest are absorbed into the fixed effect. To compensate for this, we
explore how our estimated parameter values change as we split our sample according
to different criteria, and re-estimate our main results on each sample. For brevity,
we present results only for strict grade delay of ten year olds.
Table 21 presents results for subsamples of the data, split into above- and below-
median values of: first grade pre-policy repetition rates (from 1995; columns (3) &
(4)); municipal population (in 1999; columns (5) & (6)); and municipal per capita
GDP (in 1999; columns (7) & (8)). Because not all the municipalities in our sample
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existed in 1995, we also re-run our baseline results on the sample of municipalities for
which we have 1995 repetition rates (column (2)), for comparability with columns
(3) & (4). The relevant column from full sample main results is given in column (1).
It is also possible that the success of social promotion in keeping students on track
will depend on the educational resources available inside the municipality. Table 22
extends the approach applied above to per capita values of total number of schools,
number of municipal schools, number of state schools, and number of primary school
teachers. While all of these variables do change slightly over time, this "within"
variation is tiny compared to the variation across municipalities.
While the sign and size of coefficient estimates remains quite constant across most
of these different specifications, the persistence of the effect drops off rapidly in some
of the subsets. Most notable among these are municipalities with a high number of
municipal schools per capita (Table 22, column (3)), but also small municipalities,
poor municipalities, and those with high initial first grade repetition rates (Table 21,
columns (3), (6) & (8)).
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Table 21: Municipalities: share of age group delayed one or more grades by subset
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baselines 1995 repetition rates Population GDP per capita
All 1995 High Low High Low High Low
Cycles -0.0160∗∗∗ -0.0128∗∗∗ -0.0127∗∗ -0.0138∗∗∗ -0.0162∗∗∗ -0.0155∗∗∗ -0.0154∗∗∗ -0.0163∗∗∗
(0.00329) (0.00336) (0.00568) (0.00410) (0.00350) (0.00528) (0.00438) (0.00498)
L.Cycles -0.0135∗∗∗ -0.0123∗∗∗ -0.00804 -0.0141∗∗∗ -0.00640∗ -0.0197∗∗∗ -0.0128∗∗∗ -0.0136∗∗∗
(0.00333) (0.00342) (0.00602) (0.00418) (0.00341) (0.00556) (0.00426) (0.00519)
L2.Cycles -0.0149∗∗∗ -0.0146∗∗∗ -0.0136∗∗ -0.0145∗∗∗ -0.0136∗∗∗ -0.0152∗∗ -0.0180∗∗∗ -0.00969∗
(0.00357) (0.00366) (0.00655) (0.00448) (0.00345) (0.00618) (0.00447) (0.00585)
L3.Cycles -0.00811∗∗ -0.00800∗∗ 0.000749 -0.0124∗∗∗ -0.00745∗∗ -0.0101 -0.00549 -0.0109∗
(0.00352) (0.00360) (0.00601) (0.00451) (0.00359) (0.00647) (0.00438) (0.00588)
L4.Cycles -0.00528 -0.00307 -0.00341 -0.00252 -0.00563 -0.00474 -0.00408 -0.00646
(0.00333) (0.00336) (0.00536) (0.00422) (0.00360) (0.00571) (0.00421) (0.00540)
Observations22021 19878 9929 9949 11012 11009 11010 11011
Dependent variable is the share of 11-year-olds who are one or more years delayed in their studies. Each column presents results
from a fixed effect municipality-level regression on a subset of the data, as follows: (1) full dataset; (2) municipalities which
existed in 1995 (baseline results to compare with cols (3-4)); above-median (3) and below-median (4) repetition rates in 1995;
above-median (5) and below-median (6) municipal population; above-median (7) and below-median (8) municipal GDP per
capita.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the municipality, the
number of schools by location and jurisdiction, population and municipal GDP in natural logs and in levels, the number and
education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and 5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 22: Municipalities: share of age group delayed one or more grades by subset
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Schools Municipal schools State schools Primary teachers
High Low High Low High Low High Low
Cycles -0.0118∗∗ -0.0188∗∗∗ -0.0116∗∗ -0.0191∗∗∗ -0.0127∗∗ -0.0194∗∗∗ -0.0178∗∗∗ -0.0152∗∗∗
(0.00585) (0.00400) (0.00565) (0.00404) (0.00508) (0.00428) (0.00492) (0.00447)
L.Cycles -0.00964∗ -0.0154∗∗∗ -0.00678 -0.0168∗∗∗ -0.0173∗∗∗ -0.00985∗∗ -0.00847∗ -0.0169∗∗∗
(0.00562) (0.00413) (0.00551) (0.00419) (0.00498) (0.00447) (0.00499) (0.00455)
L2.Cycles -0.0126∗∗ -0.0153∗∗∗ -0.00679 -0.0182∗∗∗ -0.0169∗∗∗ -0.0126∗∗ -0.0147∗∗ -0.0147∗∗∗
(0.00641) (0.00436) (0.00661) (0.00428) (0.00517) (0.00502) (0.00601) (0.00441)
L3.Cycles -0.00514 -0.00888∗∗ -0.00980 -0.00630 -0.00639 -0.00939∗∗ -0.00911 -0.00739∗
(0.00650) (0.00421) (0.00675) (0.00411) (0.00555) (0.00458) (0.00609) (0.00425)
L4.Cycles -0.00583 -0.00508 -0.00106 -0.00705∗ -0.00726 -0.00342 -0.00800 -0.00313
(0.00628) (0.00392) (0.00648) (0.00385) (0.00502) (0.00450) (0.00555) (0.00411)
Observations11008 11013 11008 11013 11009 11012 11008 11013
Dependent variable is the share of 11-year-olds who are one or more years delayed in their studies. Each column presents results
from a fixed effect municipality-level regression on a subset of the data, as follows: above-median (1) and below-median (2)
number of schools per capita; above-median (3) and below-median (4) number of municipal-run schools per capita; above-median
(5) and below-median (6) number of state-run schools per capita; above-median (7) and below-median (8) primary school teachers
per capita.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the municipality, the
number of schools by location and jurisdiction, population and municipal GDP in natural logs and in levels, the number and
education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and 5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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6.2 Comparisons with Previous Studies
6.2.1 Student Outcomes in Minas Gerais
In the work most closely related to our own, Koppensteiner (2014) studies the effect
of introducing the cycles policy on test scores among students at state-run school in
Minas Gerais. Studying such a restricted subset of schools has one important advan-
tage: while the length and timing of cycles varied considerably among those schools
adopting the policy across Brazil, Koppensteiner describes an implementation among
state schools in Minas Gerais that left little school-level discretion. This decreases
the measurement error in the policy variable substantially, since all schools were ap-
plying social promotion and repetition cycles along the same schedule, and allows
for a more precise interpretation of the results. The shortcoming of looking only at
state-run primary schools is that it prevents meaningful aggregation at the municipal
level, and therefore is sensitive to students sorting themselves across schools.
Although not the focus of the paper, Koppensteiner also estimates of the effect
of the policy on student flows for the two cohorts he studies. While he also finds
significant, negative effects of the policy on repetition rates, in contrast to our findings
these effects only appear in 2nd and 4th grades. In Appendix C.6 we replicate our
student flow results using only state schools in Minas Gerais. While we find very
similar estimates for 2nd and 4th grade (see Table 46), our finding of large and
significant decreases in repetition rates in grade 1 (where we still see the largest
effect) and grade 3 remain at odds with his results.
What could account for these differences? While the tables reported in Appendix
C.6 restrict our sample to state schools in Minas Gerais, we are nevertheless estimat-
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ing our model on different data sets. While Koppensteiner uses data from 2000-2006,
almost identical to our own panel, he follows only two theoretical cohorts over that
timeframe. In contrast, we estimate our model on all children enrolled in grades 1-8
between 1999-2006. As Koppensteiner observes, the absence of effect of the policy on
repetition rates in first grade arises because the cohort in question was only treated
with the policy from second grade: it should therefore be interpreted as an absence
of anticipatory effects, rather than an absence of causal impact of the policy (see
footnote 29, page 285). The difference in our estimates of the effect of the policy on
repetition rates in grade 3 remains puzzling; however, differences in the cohorts on
which the analysis was done are likely responsible.
6.2.2 The Bolsa Programs
How does the cycles policy compare with the Bolsa program? Glewwe and Kassouf
(2012) study the impact of the Bolsa escola / Bolsa familia conditional cash transfer
programme on enrolment, drop out and passing rates, both at the municipal and
school levels. In their basic school-level model without lagged values of the policy,
they find that the program increased enrolment by 2.8 percentage points for students
in grades 1-4, and 3.2 percentage points for students in grades 5-8. While our enrol-
ment regressions are at the age level rather than the grade level, we can nevertheless
approximate a comparison by averaging the coefficient in Table 14 for children ages
seven to ten (target ages for junior primary) and eleven-twelve (target ages from
grades 5 and 6). Doing so, we find a 1.9 percentage points increase in enrolment for
the junior ages, while the negative effect at age twelve dominates giving an average
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decrease of 0.4 percentage points. At the municipal level, Glewwe and Kassouf do not
find any effect of the existence of the Bolsa program in the municipality on enrolment
in younger grades, though they find a 4 percentage point increases in grades 5-8. We
find no effect of cycles on municipality-level enrolment at ages six to twelve.35
Glewwe and Kassouf also find significant school-level decreases in dropout rates,
and increases in promotion rates, due to the presence of the Bolsa program. They find
that dropout rates decrease by 0.3% across primary grades, while promotion rates
increase by 0.5% (in grades 1-4) and 0.3% (in grades 5-8). These estimates compare
to our estimates of the effect of the cycles policy (again, averaged across grades)
of 0.2% (grades 1-4) and 0.6% (grades 5-8) increases in dropout rates, and 3.3%
(grades 1-4) and 1.1% (grades 5-8) increases in promotion rates.36 The authors find
no significant effect of the existence of the program in the municipality on promotion
or dropout rates at the municipal level; we find little effect on dropout (besides an
increase in first grade), but substantial increases in promotion rates at all grades
except for grade 4.
While a thorough comparison of the two programs is beyond the scope of this
study, it is interesting to note that the magnitude of the effects on the outcomes
discussed above are in fact quite similar. The Bolsa programs increased enrolment
and reduced dropout more noticeably than the cycles program, at least at the school
level, while the cycles program increased promotion rates significantly more, in keep-
35We do not control for the Bolsa programs in our main regressions because data on the program
are only available from 2001. Furthermore, by 2004 nearly every school had students on the program
(see Table 50). In Appendix C.7 we replicate our main regression results while controlling for the
program, and find no significant changes to our results due to the program.
36See Tables 52 and 51 in Appendix C.7. Two coefficients below the 10% significance level are
included in these averages, though they are close to zero.
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ing with the goals of each program. Nevertheless, the Bolsa program – somewhat
surprisingly – also increased promotion rates.
7 Conclusion
Grade repetition has historically been a popular, but poorly understood, remedial
education policy. In this paper, we exploit extensive variation in repetition policies
in Brazil to study how the introduction of periodic social promotion affected grade
attainment and annual grade progression of primary school children.
We find that the policy did indeed reduce repetition rates, particularly in younger
grades, and brought about compensatory increases in promotion rates. Past exposure
to the cycles policy increases repetition rates in subsequent years; however, these
effects are modest and do not compensate for the reductions observed in earlier
grades. We find no convincing evidence that the social promotion policy either
reduced dropout, with the exception of a small reduction in first grade, or increased
enrolment. Our results do suggest that considerable sorting takes place between
schools in response to the policy, with social promotion attracting students in junior
grades and driving them away at higher grade levels.
The policy also affected students’ progress through school. We find that cohorts
exposed to social promotion experience less grade-delay than their peers who face
the threat of repetition every year. This improvement in age-grade matching arises
mechanically from social promotion; however, the gains achieved due to the policy
are highly persistent over time, and cumulate with further exposure. These gains
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are substantial, and appear to be driven primarily by children who would otherwise
have become “serial repeaters.” After being exposed to the policy from age seven,
by age eleven 5.6 percentage points fewer children are one or more years delayed for
their age, while 5.1 percentage points fewer children are delayed two or more years.
These results strongly suggest that, absent the social promotion policy, repetition
rates in Brazilian primary schools are too high. Students progress more rapidly
through primary school, and are less likely to fall behind in their studies, when
exposed to episodic social promotion than when they face the threat of repetition
every year. Our findings imply that a significant fraction of students who are pushed
ahead by the policy – despite low achievement – manage to make up their learning
shortfall before the subsequent retention year.
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Appendix: not for publication
A Data
A.1 Enrollment
A.1.1 Descriptive Statistics
Tables 23, 24 and 25 present municipality student enrolments in natural logs, levels
and as a share of birth cohort.
Table 23: Municipality: ln total enrolments by age
Stats Age 6 Age 7 Age 8 Age 9 Age
10
Age 11 Age 12
Mean 3.248 5.251 5.492 5.512 5.527 5.528 5.518
SD 1.697 1.169 1.146 1.143 1.138 1.136 1.135
Source: Censo Escolar, authors’ calculations. Mean values across municipalities from 1999-2006.
Table 24: Municipality: total enrolments by age
Stats Age 6 Age 7 Age 8 Age 9 Age
10
Age 11 Age 12
Mean 81.7 484.4 617.7 627.2 633.1 635.2 631.3
SD 398.0 2542.2 3267.7 3266.6 3257.9 3275.1 3252.1
Source: Censo Escolar, authors’ calculations. Mean values across municipalities from 1999-2006.
A.1.2 Enrolled Share
To calculate the share of a birth cohort that is enrolled at any point in time, we
combine student data from the Censo Escolar with age-specific counts from the year
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Table 25: Municipality: share enrolled by age
Stats Age 6 Age 7 Age 8 Age 9 Age
10
Age 11 Age 12
mean 0.2 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0
sd 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Source: Censo Escolar and INEP, authors’ calculations. Mean values across municipalities from
1999-2006.
2000 Brazilian census. We do so by summing the counts of students of each age
across grades, and dividing this total by the count of children of that same age from
the census. While the census data allow us to have an external measure of total
cohort size, several issues emerge.
First, the census reports ages of children in blocks, rather than by year. We have
counts, specifically, of children aged five to six, seven to nine, and ten to fourteen.
To deal with this, we use ( 1
m
∗N) as the denominator for our enrolled share, where
m is the number of ages aggregated (for the count of five and six-year-olds, m = 2),
and N is the total count.37
The second issue is one of data availability. The youngest children for whom we
have census data were five years old in 2000 (born in 1995), and therefore enter our
analysis at the very earliest in 2001 when they turn six. For cohorts born after 1995,
we cannot calculate the share of the cohort enrolled in school, because we do not
have an estimate of cohort size which is exogenous to enrolment. Given that data
on cycles begins in 1999, this constitutes a substantial loss of data.
Finally, although the approach outlined above should, in theory, provide an un-
37Note that this amounts to assuming that half of the sum of, e.g. five- and six-year-olds is an
unbiased estimate of the number of five-year-olds or the number of six-year-olds.
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biased estimate of the share of a birth cohort enrolled at any given time, there are
substantial disparities between the population counts reported in the Censo Escolar
and in the census. As can be seen in Table 26, enrolment figures are systemati-
cally larger than counts of children of the same age from the census, starting from
age eight. The most likely explanation for this is over-reporting by schools of an-
nual enrolment figures. Indeed, since the introduction of the Fundo de Manutenção
e Desenvolvimento do Ensino Fundamental (FUNDEF) in 1998, transfers to mu-
nicipalities for spending on primary education were tied to the number of enrolled
students reported in the Censo Escolar. Further evidence for such an explanation
comes from the fact that, when unique student identifiers were introduced the the
Censo Escolar in 2007 - effectively making it more difficult to over-report - student
numbers fell significantly.
Table 26: Enrolled share over time by birth cohort
Year 1995 1994 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989 1988
1999 . . 0.20 0.86 1.04 1.00 1.04 1.04
2000 . 0.16 0.87 1.02 1.04 1.00 1.02 1.03
2001 0.17 0.87 1.04 1.04 1.05 0.99 1.01 .
2002 0.91 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.05 0.99 . .
2003 1.08 1.08 1.07 1.05 1.04 . . .
2004 1.09 1.08 1.06 1.04 . . . .
2005 1.09 1.07 1.05 . . . . .
2006 1.08 1.05 . . . . . .
Source: Censo Escolar and INEP, authors’ calculations. Mean values across municipalities.
We cannot test this theory directly, but we can compare municipalities which
adopt cycles with those who do not. While we do not have an unbiased second
estimate of cohort size, as a first check we can compare the maximal enrolment figure
59
for a given cohort - that is, the largest number of students enrolled in any year - to
our census cohort estimate. Table 27 compares the percent difference in enrolment
of the 1994 cohort for municipalities with and without cycles. Note that this percent
difference is constant across years (the census estimate and the maximal enrolment
are time-invariant), however municipalities move between the two groups depending
on their current cycles policy. While this test is in no way definitive, it gives us some
confidence that the two groups of municipalities are not wildly different.
Table 27: Percent difference between maximum enrolment and census for
students born in 1994
Year Cycles Std. Dev. No cycles Std. Dev.
1999 0.167 0.643 0.166 0.285
2000 0.167 0.637 0.166 0.282
2001 0.146 0.234 0.172 0.433
2002 0.148 0.231 0.172 0.435
2003 0.147 0.228 0.172 0.435
2004 0.163 0.617 0.168 0.289
2005 0.165 0.618 0.167 0.289
2006 0.168 0.641 0.166 0.287
Source: Censo Escolar and INEP, authors’ calculations. Mean values across municipalities.
A.2 Student Flows
Table 28 shows how passing and repetition rates have varied over time for grade 1
students.
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Table 28: Municipality-level average grade 1 student flows
Year Pass Drop Repeat
1999 0.714 0.109 0.154
2000 0.699 0.114 0.157
2001 0.729 0.086 0.157
2002 0.740 0.069 0.156
2003 0.731 0.067 0.158
2004 0.737 0.069 0.167
2005 0.752 0.058 0.164
Source: Censo Escolar, authors’ calculations. Mean values across municipalities from 1999-2006.
A.3 Control Variables
Summary statistics for the list of school covariates are given in Table 29, while
municipal covariates are given in Table 30. All variables are taken directly from the
Censo Escolar and IPEA, except for Training of teachers (at levels 1-4 and 5-8).
This last variable is an index of mean education levels of teachers teaching at the
specified grade levels, coded such that 0 represents less than primary education, 1
is completed primary education, 2 is completed secondary education, and 3 is any
form of tertiary training. Summary statistics on the number and education levels of
teachers in the school panel are calculated conditional on having at least one teacher
teaching at that level.
B The Cycles Policy
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Table 29: Time-varying school controls
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Urban 0.415 0.493 1372731
Municipal 0.704 0.456 1372731
State 0.186 0.389 1372731
Total teachers 12.122 16.92 1372731
Primary teachers 9.242 12.143 1372731
Teachers teaching
1-4
5.099 6.186 1281859
Training of teach-
ers 1-4
2.061 0.592 1281859
Teachers teaching
5-8
14.941 11.453 428136
Training of teach-
ers 5-8
2.679 0.402 428136
Source: Censo Escolar, authors’ calculations. Mean values across municipalities from 1999-2006.
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Table 30: Time-varying municipal controls
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Schools: number 31.092 66.018 44056
Schools: urban 12.907 59.471 44056
Schools: munici-
pal
21.902 31.86 44056
Schools: state 5.784 20.134 44056
Schools: private 3.399 28.181 44056
Population 31874.608 190634.984 44056
Ln population 9.366 1.129 44056
Ln municipal gdp 10.566 1.392 44056
Municipal gdp 227680.017 2601262.8 44056
Teachers teaching
1-4
148.103 631.03 44056
Training of teach-
ers 1-4
2.244 0.375 44055
Teachers teaching
5-8
144.922 768.349 44056
Training of teach-
ers 5-8
2.654 0.334 44028
Source: Censo Escolar, authors’ calculations. Mean values across municipalities from 1999-2006.
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B.1 Predicting cycle adoption
Our empirical strategy relies on the assumption that there are no variables which have
a time-varying effect on the coefficients of interest. While we cannot test this assump-
tion directly, we explore it in the following ways. First, we predict municipality-level
promotion policies using the baseline controls present in our main regressions. These
characteristics are likely to affect both municipal policies and student outcomes; and
as can be seen in Table 31, some do. This is not a problem in itself, however this
can shed light what other (unobserved) factors might be a concern. The education
score of upper primary school teachers is highly significant: a 1 point increase in the
average education score (appx 3 standard deviations) is associated with 2 percentage
points more schools in that municipality adopting the policy. If hiring more highly
educated upper primary school teachers is correlated with some more fundamental
(and time-varying) municipal characteristic, this would be cause for concern. Given
that even this measured effect is relatively modest in size, we proceed under the
assumption given above.
Table 32 also predicts the adoption of the policy, this time augmenting our base-
line controls with time-interacted pre-policy repetition rates and political affiliations
of the mayor and state governor.38 We do not find evidence of significant variation
over time in the effect of these controls on promotion policies; however, we never-
theless replicate our main results with these alternate sets of controls (see Appendix
C.8).
38Mayor-president affiliations are derived from a list of parties in congress who supported the
central government (available on request). Mayor-governor affiliations are based on the actual
parties to which the current mayor and current governor belong.
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Table 31: Policy adoption: standard controls
(1)
Cycles
Number of urban schools -0.000152
(0.000570)
Number of municipal schools -0.000390∗
(0.000202)
Number of state schools 0.00172∗∗
(0.000817)
Number of private schools 0.0000285
(0.000656)
Municipal population 6.88e-08
(0.000000172)
Log municipal population 0.00826
(0.0163)
Log municipal gdp -0.0191
(0.0116)
Municipal GDP in 000 yr-2000 Real 6.55e-09
(9.70e-09)
Number of teachers grades 1_4 0.0000701∗
(0.0000359)
Ed score of teachers grades 1_4 0.0107
(0.00736)
Number of teachers grades 5_8 -0.0000253
(0.0000414)
Ed score of teachers grades 5_8 0.0213∗∗∗
(0.00825)
Observations 44027
Dependent variable is the weighted share of schools in a municipality using social promotion. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Additional controls (not shown): state-time
interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 32: Policy adoption: additional controls with year interactions
(1) (2) (3)
Mayor’s party
aligned with presi-
dent
Mayor and governor
same party
1995 repetition rate
1999 0.0128 -0.0191∗ 0.0207
(0.00901) (0.0104) (0.0466)
2000 -0.0109 0.00167 0.0832
(0.00784) (0.00921) (0.0552)
2001 0.0136∗ -0.00206 0.0462
(0.00798) (0.00670) (0.0596)
2002 0.00538 0.00625 0.0511
(0.00852) (0.00733) (0.0542)
2003 0.00960 -0.000191 0.122∗
(0.00820) (0.00659) (0.0645)
2004 0.0115 0.00335 0.0115
(0.00806) (0.00712) (0.0667)
2005 0.00173 0.00502 0.212∗∗∗
(0.00805) (0.00810) (0.0685)
0.0207 2006 -0.00777 0.00678 (0.0466)
(0.00760) (0.0111)
Observations 39755
Dependent variable is the weighted share of schools in a municipality using social promotion. Table
reports coefficients on column*row interacted variables in a single regression.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Controls (not shown): the number of
schools in the municipality, the number of schools by location and jurisdiction, population and
municipal GDP in natural logs and in levels, the number and education scores of teachers teaching
grades 1-4 and 5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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B.2 Empirical description of adoption
While we do not have data on the duration and number of cycles for all years of
our panel, we do have this information for some years. Tables 33 and 34 list raw
descriptive statistics on the number of cycles and the duration of the first cycle, for
all schools giving a non-empty answer to these questions in the 1999 Censo Escolar.
Table 33: Number of cycles
Number Per cent
0 99 0
1 14,641 45
2 14,778 46
3 966 3
4 1,819 6
8 2 0
14 1 0
Total 32,306 100
Source: Censo Escolar 1999, raw frequencies. Observations are at the school level.
Table 34: Length of first cycle
Number Per cent
0 60 0
1 3,933 13
2 8,385 28
3 4,640 15
4 12,938 43
5 58 0
6 1 0
8 12 0
Total 30,027 100
Source: Censo Escolar 1999, raw frequencies. Observations are at the school level.
Figure 2 shows that the share of schools in a municipality which use cycles is
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Figure 2: Distribution of cycle frequency: municipal means
Figure 3: Distribution of cycles: municipal vs. state schools (weighted)
highly bimodal. Note that the data are aggregated over all years in our sample.
Most municipalities make no use of cycles; those that do, however, commonly adopt
entirely. This bimodality is even more pronounced when looking at school jurisdic-
tions individually, as can be seen in Figure 3.
Table 35 lists the share of municipalities coded as ‘adopters’ for varying thresh-
olds. Our primary results are shown to be robust to these different thresholds in
Appendix C.5.
68
Table 35: Share of municipalities adopting cycles, by threshold of use
10 % 25% 33% 50% 66% 75% 90%
1999 0.502 0.441 0.408 0.313 0.226 0.192 0.151
2000 0.478 0.419 0.385 0.293 0.206 0.178 0.134
2001 0.472 0.416 0.381 0.287 0.201 0.174 0.131
2002 0.467 0.414 0.382 0.286 0.197 0.166 0.120
2003 0.445 0.391 0.364 0.265 0.186 0.160 0.115
2004 0.429 0.384 0.354 0.258 0.176 0.146 0.104
2005 0.424 0.387 0.368 0.284 0.216 0.189 0.149
2006 0.371 0.338 0.320 0.238 0.176 0.154 0.117
Source: Censo Escolar, authors’ calculations. Mean values across municipalities.
B.3 Geographic Variation
The popularity of cycles policies varies considerably across regions. A brief descrip-
tion of the general patterns follows: these overviews are based on a visual inspection
of the distribution of municipality-level adoption rates for the years 1999, 2001, 2003
and 2005, for state-run and municipality-run schools separately.
Cycles in the North Municipal schools in the North have low or zero cycle
adoption rates over the period. Rates are similarly low in state schools, with a few
exceptions: state schools in Roraima report some cycle use (with a few municipali-
ties registering a 100% adoption), while state schools in Tocantins have a range of
adoption rates in 1999, diminishing to zero by 2003.
Cycles in the Northeast Municipal schools in the Northeast have low or zero
cycle adoption rates, with the exception of Rio Grande do Norte which displays
a strong bimodal distribution of municipalities: some adopt at near-census rates,
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while others avoid the policy entirely (rates peak in 2001-2003). Cycles are more
prevalent among state schools. While half of the states have low or zero adoption,
Ceará and Bahia display a ‘messy’ bimodal distribution (with some interior mass)
from 1999-2003, and Pernambuco has such an adoption pattern in 2005 only (with
no cycles prior to this). State schools in Rio Grande do Norte have a messy bimodal
adoption pattern in 1999, which strengthens to a strong level of adoption in 2005
(most municipalities at 100%, and no mass at zero).
Cycles in the South Both municipal schools and state schools in the south
adopted cycles at trivial rates, with the stark exception of municipal schools in
Paraná. Municipal schools in Paraná display a distinctly bimodal adoption rate:
most municipalities either fully adopt, or do not adopt cycles at all.
Cycles in the Southeast Municipal schools in the Southeast display a strongly
bimodal distribution of adoption rates (Espírito Santo deviates slightly from this
trend in 2005, with more interior points). State schools in general all adopted cycles.
Exceptions to this are Minas Gerais in 2001 and 2003, and Espírito Santo in 2005,
which are bimodal.
Cycles in the Centre-West The Centre-West region does not seem to follow a
common trend. In Goiás, no schools adopted cycles at any point. In Mato Grosso
do Sul, from 1999-2003, state schools all had cycles, while municipal schools mostly
didn’t, with some exceptions (including several with 100% adoption). In 2005, these
rates fall to zero in both dependencies. Both municipal and state schools in Mato
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Grosso display bimodal adoption rates throughout the time period, with non-trivial
interior mass among state schools.
B.4 Weighting
Our primary cycles variable is computed using the share of schools in a given mu-
nicipality in a given year who report using cycles, weighted by the primary school
enrolment of those schools in that year. Table 36 presents a summary statistic com-
parison between weighted and unweighted measures.
Table 36: Cycle prevalence: comparison of weighted and unweighted mea-
sures
Weighted Unweighted
Year Overall Municipal State Overall Municipal State
1999 0.317 0.212 0.423 0.242 0.190 0.416
2000 0.298 0.229 0.376 0.243 0.208 0.375
2001 0.293 0.233 0.372 0.240 0.212 0.372
2002 0.289 0.246 0.360 0.242 0.224 0.360
2003 0.274 0.239 0.338 0.234 0.220 0.340
2004 0.264 0.238 0.313 0.239 0.228 0.321
2005 0.286 0.241 0.364 0.248 0.232 0.364
2006 0.243 0.225 0.283 0.219 0.218 0.286
Source: Censo Escolar, authors’ calculations. Mean values across municipalities.
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C Robustness
C.1 Total Enrollment in Levels
Tables 37 and 38 replicate the natural log enrolment regressions (see Tables 15 and
14 in Section 5.1), this time in levels rather than natural logs. A comparison of the
means and standard deviations of these variables is given in Appendix A.1. The
municipality regressions suggest that a history of cycles may have some positive
impact on enrolment at ages eleven and twelve, while contemporaneous cycles have
a negative effect at age eight. School-level regressions in Table 38 present much the
same story as the equivalent table in natural logs: increases in enrolment at junior
primary ages seven to ten, and decreases at age twelve. Note that the school-level
regression are conditional on enrolments at that age being positive. This maintains
the same sample as the natural log enrolment regression, and prevents schools which
do not offer higher grades from displaying ‘negative’ effects on enrolment as they
reduce age-for-grade mismatches.39
C.2 Enrolled Share of Cohort
Increasing enrolment is in fact an indirect measure of a more fundamental goal:
achieving universal enrolment of primary-school aged children. Using counts of chil-
dren of different ages from the 2000 census, we replicate our municipality-level re-
gressions using the enroled share of a birth cohort. This process, and some of the
issues which arise from the measure, are described in Appendix A.1.2. Results from
39Consider a primary school that offers only grades 1-4: unless children are very delayed in their
schooling, there should be no twelve-year-olds at that school.
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Table 37: Municipalities: total enrolments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 7 Age 8 Age 9 Age 10 Age 11 Age 12
Cycles -5.599 -4.639 -2.029 -2.578 -3.937∗ 1.248
(14.38) (2.993) (2.999) (1.943) (2.135) (2.162)
L.Cycles -2.867 0.196 -0.715 0.594 -1.232 -0.338
(7.457) (2.996) (3.270) (2.123) (2.291) (2.774)
L2.Cycles 2.697 -1.453 3.995 6.258∗∗ -2.139
(2.522) (2.589) (2.526) (2.740) (2.881)
L3.Cycles 1.378 1.964 9.836∗ 3.683
(2.619) (2.924) (5.199) (3.530)
L4.Cycles 1.356 7.395∗∗ 7.092∗
(2.612) (3.543) (3.707)
L5.Cycles -2.016 3.475
(3.162) (4.055)
Observations38531 33029 27526 22021 16519 16519
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Each column presents results from a
fixed effect municipality-level regression. Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the
municipality, the number of schools by location and jurisdiction, population and municipal GDP
in natural logs and in levels, the number and education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and
5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
73
Table 38: Schools: total enrolments (conditional on positive enrolment at
that age)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 7 Age 8 Age 9 Age 10 Age 11 Age 12
Cycles 0.357∗∗∗ 0.00423 0.186∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.113 -0.207
(0.106) (0.101) (0.108) (0.117) (0.170) (0.169)
L.Cycles -0.109 0.197∗∗ 0.0859 0.256∗∗ -0.318∗ -0.251
(0.100) (0.0946) (0.105) (0.118) (0.166) (0.155)
L2.Cycles 0.0110 0.0439 0.141 0.245 0.0298
(0.0930) (0.101) (0.116) (0.172) (0.166)
L3.Cycles 0.248∗∗ 0.122 -0.152 -0.172
(0.0972) (0.114) (0.164) (0.164)
L4.Cycles 0.169 -0.0121 -0.321∗∗
(0.105) (0.153) (0.145)
L5.Cycles 0.0600 0.242∗
(0.142) (0.140)
Observations960116 831636 675264 539830 390857 366025
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. Each column presents results from a fixed
effect school-level regression. Controls (not shown): dummy for location (rural or urban), a dummy
for jurisdiction (state, municipal or private), total number of teachers, number of teachers at the
primary level and state-year interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
74
age-specific regressions with enroled share of birth cohort as the dependant variable
are presented in Table 39: as in our primary result, we do not find any significant
pattern of effect.
Table 39: Municipalities: share of cohort enroled
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 7 Age 8 Age 9 Age 10 Age 11 Age 12
Cycles -0.0195 0.0131 -0.00291 0.0363 -0.0263∗∗ 0.00460
(0.0322) (0.0125) (0.0123) (0.0327) (0.0111) (0.00895)
L.Cycles 0.00168 -0.0237 0.00722 0.00280 0.0260 -0.00733
(0.00875) (0.0313) (0.0136) (0.0102) (0.0285) (0.0104)
L2.Cycles 0.00185 -0.0300 0.0124 0.00423 0.0503
(0.00881) (0.0354) (0.0135) (0.0106) (0.0444)
L3.Cycles 0.00142 -0.0315 0.0177 -0.00450
(0.00865) (0.0370) (0.0132) (0.0113)
L4.Cycles 0.00512 -0.0129 -0.0108
(0.00910) (0.0343) (0.0222)
L5.Cycles 0.00419 -0.0241
(0.00893) (0.0339)
Observations16507 16507 16510 16511 16516 16516
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Each column presents results from a
fixed effect municipality-level regression. Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the
municipality, the number of schools by location and jurisdiction, population and municipal GDP
in natural logs and in levels, the number and education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and
5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
C.3 Attainment measures
Table 40 presents results of a regression of past and present policy adoption of the
share of an age cohort studying at a grade level too advanced for their age (for
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example, a seven-year-old studying in grade two). If the social promotion policy is
implemented as expected – that is, by promoting poorly performing students who
would otherwise have been retained – we would not expect the policy to significantly
affect the number of students who are exceptionally advanced. Table C.3.1 reassures
us that this is indeed the case.
C.3.1 Advanced students
Table 40: Municipalities: share of age group ahead of grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 7 Age 8 Age 9 Age 10 Age 11 Age 12
Cycles 0.00203 0.000575 -0.000213 -0.000248 -0.000499 -0.00187
(0.00217) (0.00132) (0.00147) (0.00127) (0.00175) (0.00145)
L.Cycles 0.000627 0.0000211 -0.000442 -0.00145 -0.00303∗ -0.00186
(0.00196) (0.00131) (0.00159) (0.00141) (0.00177) (0.00169)
L2.Cycles -0.00106 0.000371 0.00126 0.00281∗ -0.00205
(0.00118) (0.00157) (0.00129) (0.00157) (0.00156)
L3.Cycles -0.00263 -0.00424∗∗ 0.00244 0.000882
(0.00175) (0.00195) (0.00237) (0.00248)
L4.Cycles -0.00190 0.000372 0.000425
(0.00172) (0.00221) (0.00206)
L5.Cycles -0.00212 0.000222
(0.00182) (0.00181)
Observations38513 33029 27526 22021 16519 16519
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Each column presents results from a
fixed effect municipality-level regression. Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the
municipality, the number of schools by location and jurisdiction, population and municipal GDP
in natural logs and in levels, the number and education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and
5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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C.3.2 Grade attainment
To calculate the mean grade attainment for a given birth cohort, we simply multiply
the number of students of that year in each grade by the grade level, and divide
by the total number of students born in that year. Equation (4) formalizes this
approach, where g is a grade level, and ng the number of students enroled at that
level.
Eaijt =
∑g
1...8(ng ∗ g)∑g
1...8 ng
(4)
Table 41 gives the municipality average grade of students, by age, for each year of
the sample. Note that the target grade for seven-year-olds is grade 1, and that average
grade would increase by 1 each year if all students were promoted. If all student
advanced on schedule, the mean grade for twelve-year-olds would be 6. While twelve-
year-olds remain, in 2006, more than one year behind, there is steady improvement
in this measure over the 8 years of the panel: the mean grade in 2006 is higher than
in 1999 at all ages above seven.
Tables 42 and 43 present a series of regressions with the mean grade level at each
age as the dependant variable. Note that this variable is calculated based only on
those students enroled in school, therefore the minimum value is achieved when all
students of that age who are enroled are in grade 1.
Tables 42 and 43 show that the social promotion policy had a significant and
lasting impact on the average grade level of each birth cohort. The absence of
an effect at age seven is unsurprising: students are normally enrolled in primary
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Table 41: Municipality-average grade attainment by age
Year age 6 age 7 age 8 age 9 age 10 age 11 age 12
1999 1.02 1.10 1.60 2.24 2.95 3.61 .
2000 1.02 1.08 1.62 2.29 2.99 3.71 4.39
2001 1.03 1.09 1.66 2.36 3.08 3.79 4.54
2002 1.03 1.08 1.68 2.42 3.17 3.90 4.63
2003 1.02 1.09 1.70 2.46 3.24 4.00 4.75
2004 1.02 1.09 1.70 2.48 3.27 4.07 4.84
2005 1.02 1.09 1.68 2.47 3.28 4.10 4.90
2006 . 1.09 1.67 2.46 3.29 4.12 4.94
Source: Censo Escolar, authors’ calculations. Mean values across municipalities.
Table 42: Municipalities: average grade (no lag)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 7 Age 8 Age 9 Age 10 Age 11 Age 12
Cycles 0.00000660 0.0232∗∗∗ 0.0322∗∗∗ 0.0338∗∗∗ 0.0282∗∗∗ 0.0166∗∗∗
(0.00193) (0.00369) (0.00433) (0.00451) (0.00489) (0.00535)
Observations44009 44027 44027 44027 44027 38531
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Each column presents results from a
fixed effect municipality-level regression. Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the
municipality, the number of schools by location and jurisdiction, population and municipal GDP
in natural logs and in levels, the number and education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and
5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 43: Municipalities: average grade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 7 Age 8 Age 9 Age 10 Age 11 Age 12
Cycles 0.00201 0.0233∗∗∗ 0.0294∗∗∗ 0.0300∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.0154∗
(0.00228) (0.00438) (0.00529) (0.00543) (0.00733) (0.00802)
L.Cycles 0.000395 0.0240∗∗∗ 0.0278∗∗∗ 0.0295∗∗∗ 0.0326∗∗∗ 0.0349∗∗∗
(0.00203) (0.00429) (0.00545) (0.00568) (0.00758) (0.00786)
L2.Cycles 0.00931∗∗ 0.0296∗∗∗ 0.0349∗∗∗ 0.0391∗∗∗ 0.0272∗∗∗
(0.00405) (0.00562) (0.00594) (0.00838) (0.00860)
L3.Cycles 0.00464 0.00964 0.0316∗∗∗ 0.0243∗∗
(0.00529) (0.00643) (0.00881) (0.0100)
L4.Cycles 0.00606 0.0209∗∗ 0.0153∗
(0.00604) (0.00880) (0.00869)
L5.Cycles 0.00237 0.0106
(0.00782) (0.00773)
Observations38513 33029 27526 22021 16519 16519
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Each column presents results from a
fixed effect municipality-level regression. Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the
municipality, the number of schools by location and jurisdiction, population and municipal GDP
in natural logs and in levels, the number and education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and
5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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school for the first time at this age, and therefore have not yet faced the possibility
of repetition. From age eight onwards, both contemporary social promotion and
past exposure to social promotion increase average grade level. By looking at the
coefficients along the diagonal, we can see that the positive effect of past policy
exposure is highly persistent over time. The coefficients are also quite similar in
magnitude, regardless the age of exposure, ranging from approximately 0.01 to 0.04,
with a mean around 0.03. In other words, exposure to the policy during one year
increases the average grade attainment of the enrolled cohort permanently, with 3
children out of 100 at a grade level higher than they would be without the policy.
C.4 Omitting teacher controls
Table 44 replicates our main results omitting the four time-varying teacher controls
used in our baseline.
C.5 Alternate Cycles Measures
As described in Section 3.2, we aggregate individual schools’ adoption of the cycles
policy to create a municipal-level variable. In our primary specification, we code
a municipality as having adopted the policy if at least 75% of all schools in the
municipality (weighted by enrolment) have done so. While the bi-modality of policy
adoption rates within municipalities suggests this is reasonable, we explore several
other thresholds to be sure this is the case. Table 45 presents a series of regressions
where the share of delayed ten-year-olds is the dependant variable. In the regressions,
the threshold for coding a municipality as having cycles varies from 10% of schools
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Table 44: Municipalities: share of age group delayed one or more grades,
teacher controls omitted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 8 Age 9 Age 10 Age 11 Age 12
Cycles -0.0227∗∗∗ -0.0163∗∗∗ -0.0159∗∗∗ -0.0132∗∗∗ -0.00311
(0.00389) (0.00379) (0.00328) (0.00347) (0.00355)
L.Cycles -0.0237∗∗∗ -0.0115∗∗∗ -0.0133∗∗∗ -0.0103∗∗∗ -0.0113∗∗∗
(0.00378) (0.00370) (0.00333) (0.00383) (0.00362)
L2.Cycles -0.0104∗∗∗ -0.0161∗∗∗ -0.0149∗∗∗ -0.00768∗ -0.00425
(0.00368) (0.00408) (0.00357) (0.00447) (0.00430)
L3.Cycles -0.00624∗ -0.00816∗∗ -0.0124∗∗∗ -0.0107∗∗
(0.00344) (0.00353) (0.00451) (0.00465)
L4.Cycles -0.00523 -0.0128∗∗∗ -0.00924∗∗
(0.00334) (0.00437) (0.00416)
L5.Cycles -0.00267 -0.00336
(0.00397) (0.00364)
Observations 33041 27534 22027 16521 16521
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Each column presents results from a fixed
effect municipality-level regression. Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the municipality,
the number of schools by location and jurisdiction, population and municipal GDP in natural logs
and in levels, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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having adopted, to 90%. Table 35 in Appendix B gives the share of municipalities
coded as using cycles for each of these thresholds.
Not surprisingly, the effect of cycle adoption on repetition rates increases as we
strengthen our definition of municipality-level adoption: fewer and fewer schools are
implementing cycles, and therefore the policy is affecting fewer and fewer students.
Above the 50% threshold results are strongly similar across specifications.
Table 45: Share of 10 y.o. delayed one or more grades: alternate cycles
measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
10% 25% 33% 50% 66% 75% 90%
Cycles -
0.00528∗∗
-
0.00631∗∗
-
0.00774∗∗∗
-
0.0113∗∗∗
-
0.0156∗∗∗
-
0.0160∗∗∗
-
0.0139∗∗∗
(0.00266) (0.00260) (0.00261) (0.00263) (0.00300) (0.00329) (0.00354)
L.Cycles -
0.00976∗∗∗
-
0.00974∗∗∗
-
0.0105∗∗∗
-
0.00886∗∗∗
-
0.0133∗∗∗
-
0.0135∗∗∗
-
0.0154∗∗∗
(0.00248) (0.00260) (0.00256) (0.00257) (0.00302) (0.00333) (0.00368)
L2.Cycles -
0.00980∗∗∗
-
0.00928∗∗∗
-
0.00911∗∗∗
-
0.0126∗∗∗
-
0.0129∗∗∗
-
0.0149∗∗∗
-
0.0178∗∗∗
(0.00257) (0.00245) (0.00253) (0.00256) (0.00326) (0.00357) (0.00405)
L3.Cycles -0.00489∗ -
0.00533∗∗
-
0.00666∗∗
-0.00335 -
0.00970∗∗∗
-
0.00811∗∗
-0.00554
(0.00268) (0.00256) (0.00263) (0.00271) (0.00342) (0.00352) (0.00409)
L4.Cycles -0.00147 0.000550 0.000465 -0.00214 -0.00380 -0.00528 -
0.00907∗∗
(0.00243) (0.00235) (0.00239) (0.00239) (0.00302) (0.00333) (0.00392)
Observations22021 22021 22021 22021 22021 22021 22021
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Each column presents results from a fixed effect
municipality-level regression. Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the municipality, the number of
schools by location and jurisdiction, population and municipal GDP in natural logs and in levels, the number
and education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and 5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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C.6 Restricting to Minas Gerais
In order to make our findings comparable to those of Koppensteiner (2014), we
extend our school-level regressions to study drop-out and repetition rates. For com-
parability, we restrict our analysis to the state of Minas Gerais. We estimate these
regressions both for all schools, and for state-run schools only, as this last is the
sample Koppensteiner studies. In all cases we do not include lagged values of the
policy variable.
Tables 46 and 47 display results from regressions with repetition rates and dropout
rates as outcome variables, for the state school sample. For comparison with our main
results, Tables 48 and 49 display results from similar regressions using all schools in
Minas Gerais. For repetition rates, the coefficients on the policy variable are in
both cases substantially larger than those in our country-wide regressions, although
the sign and precision of the estimates is maintained. The effect of the policy on
dropout rates is also somewhat larger than in our baseline specification, though the
magnitude remains modest.
Table 46: School-level student flows in Minas Gerais state schools (no lags):
repeated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4
Cycles -0.167∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.0718∗∗∗ -0.0882∗∗∗
(0.00475) (0.00389) (0.00394) (0.00362)
Observations 17562 17688 17876 18066
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. Each column presents results from a fixed effect
school-level regression. Sample restricted to state schools in Minas Gerais. Controls (not shown):
dummy for location (rural or urban), a dummy for jurisdiction (state, municipal or private), the
number and education of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 47: School-level student flows in Minas Gerais state schools (no lags):
dropped
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4
Cycles -0.00299 -0.00262 -0.00188 -0.00261
(0.00253) (0.00194) (0.00201) (0.00205)
Observations 17562 17688 17876 18066
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. Each column presents results from a fixed effect
school-level regression. Sample restricted to state schools in Minas Gerais. Controls (not shown):
dummy for location (rural or urban), a dummy for jurisdiction (state, municipal or private), the
number and education of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 48: School-level student flows in Minas Gerais (no lags): repeated
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4
Cycles -0.163∗∗∗ -0.0729∗∗∗ -0.0807∗∗∗ -0.0315∗∗∗
(0.00307) (0.00267) (0.00241) (0.00224)
Observations 81411 80995 80426 78806
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. Each column presents results from a fixed
effect school-level regression. Sample restricted to the state of Minas Gerais. Controls (not shown):
dummy for location (rural or urban), a dummy for jurisdiction (state, municipal or private), the
number and education of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 49: School-level student flows in Minas Gerais (no lags): dropped
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4
Cycles -0.00546∗∗∗ -0.00560∗∗∗ -0.00839∗∗∗ -0.00503∗∗∗
(0.00192) (0.00166) (0.00170) (0.00173)
Observations 81411 80995 80426 78806
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. Each column presents results from a fixed
effect school-level regression. Sample restricted to the state of Minas Gerais. Controls (not shown):
dummy for location (rural or urban), a dummy for jurisdiction (state, municipal or private), the
number and education of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and year.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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C.7 Bolsa Escola
During our panel, the Bolsa escola (later Bolsa familia) conditional cash transfer
program was rolled out across Brazil. Data on the presence of the program at a
given school was first collected in 2001: by 2004, nearly every school was responding
positively (see Table 50 in Appendix A.3). Glewwe and Kassouf (2012) show that
Bolsa escola increased enrolment and promotion rates and reduced dropout. If the
adoption of the cycles policy is correlated with availability of the Bolsa program -
for instance, if some municipalities are ‘early adopters’ - this could confound our
estimates.
Table 50: Share of municipalities with Bolsa students
Year Mean
1999 .
2000 .
2001 0.469
2002 0.961
2003 0.983
2004 0.995
2005 0.995
2006 0.999
Source: Censo Escolar, authors’ calculations. Mean values across municipalities.
To explore this possibility, we re-estimate our enrolment, promotion and dropout
equations, controlling for the presence of the program in that municipality. While
we present a set of school-level results for comparability (see Tables 51 and 52),
we do not replicate the full set of results for schools. Given that students can sort
themselves across schools in response to both the cycle policy and the Bolsa program,
it would be difficult or impossible to interpret any differences that emerged. As the
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survey simply asked whether Bolsa escola exists at the school, but not how many
students were eligible or enrolled, we follow Glewwe and Kassouf (2012) by using
presence of the program as a binary indicator. We aggregate this at the municipality
level, with Bolsa equal to one if any schools report the program.
Because data on Bolsa escola were first collected in 2001, the sample on which we
estimate these equations is smaller than our baseline sample. To compare estimates
with and without the Bolsa control, we first re-estimate our primary specification
using only the subsample of municipalities with a valid Bolsa observation. We then
estimate the same equation, with the addition of the Bolsa dummy variable.
Tables 53 and 54 present the results on enrolment. Compared to our baseline
specification (see Table 15), restricting the sample to the Bolsa years does change
our estimates. While our baseline specification shows no effect of the cycles policy
on the natural log of enrolment, Table 53 suggests that, restricting to the sample to
Bolsa years, cycles may have a negative effect on the enrolment of older children.
When we compare these estimates to Table 54, however, we see that the addition of
a dummy variable for Bolsa escola has only negligible effects on our estimated cycles
coefficients: the effect is purely due to the sample restriction.
Tables 55 and 56 repeat this approach for passing rates, while Table 57 and 58
do the same for dropouts. In both cases, we observe only the slightest changes in
estimates when controlling for the Bolsa program.
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Table 51: School-level student flows (no lags): promoted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 7 Grade 8
Cycles 0.0713∗∗∗ 0.0220∗∗∗ 0.0211∗∗∗ 0.0191∗∗∗ 0.00438∗∗∗ 0.0260∗∗∗ -
0.00436∗∗∗
0.0248∗∗∗
(0.00170) (0.00169) (0.00156) (0.00163) (0.00158) (0.00189) (0.00165) (0.00308)
Obs 1033310 1017858 990673 932982 353542 328867 310258 292118
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. Each column presents results from a fixed
effect school-level regression. Controls (not shown): dummy for location (rural or urban), a dummy
for jurisdiction (state, municipal or private), total number of teachers, number of teachers at the
primary level, number and education score of teachers teaching grades 1-4 (for columns (1)-(4)) or
teaching grades 5-8 (for columns (5)-(8)), and state-year interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 52: School-level student flows (no lags): dropped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 7 Grade 8
Cycles 0.00303∗∗∗ -
0.0019∗∗
0.00541∗∗∗ -
0.0024∗∗∗
0.00847∗∗∗ -
0.00011
0.0121∗∗∗ 0.00415∗∗∗
(0.000905)(0.000725)(0.000804)(0.000798)(0.00104) (0.000934)(0.00113) (0.00105)
Obs 1033310 1017858 990673 932982 353542 328867 310258 292118
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. Each column presents results from a fixed
effect school-level regression. Controls (not shown): dummy for location (rural or urban), a dummy
for jurisdiction (state, municipal or private), total number of teachers, number of teachers at the
primary level, number and education score of teachers teaching grades 1-4 (for columns (1)-(4)) or
teaching grades 5-8 (for columns (5)-(8)), and state-year interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 53: Municipalities: ln total enrolments (no lag) - Bolsa sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 7 Age 8 Age 9 Age 10 Age 11 Age 12
Cycles -0.0125 0.00411 0.00435 0.00653 -0.00867∗∗ -0.00581
(0.00988) (0.00429) (0.00510) (0.00406) (0.00391) (0.00396)
Observations33012 33029 33029 33029 33029 33029
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Each column presents results from a fixed
effect municipality-level regression. Sample is restricted to those municipality-years with Bolsa data.
Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the municipality, the number of schools by location
and jurisdiction, population and municipal GDP in natural logs and in levels, the number and
education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and 5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 54: Municipalities: ln total enrolments (no lag)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age 7 Age 8 Age 9 Age 10 Age 11 Age 12
Cycles -0.0125 0.00409 0.00433 0.00651 -0.00868∗∗ -0.00582
(0.00988) (0.00428) (0.00510) (0.00406) (0.00391) (0.00396)
bolsa 0.00963 0.00752∗∗ 0.00993∗∗ 0.00644∗ 0.00349 0.00660∗∗
(0.00640) (0.00367) (0.00388) (0.00338) (0.00355) (0.00332)
Observations33012 33029 33029 33029 33029 33029
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Each column presents results from a
fixed effect municipality-level regression. Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the
municipality, the number of schools by location and jurisdiction, population and municipal GDP
in natural logs and in levels, the number and education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and
5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 55: Municipality student flows (no lags) - Bolsa sample: promoted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 7 Grade 8
Cycles 0.0412∗∗∗ 0.00315 0.0211∗∗∗ -
0.00007
0.0263∗∗∗ 0.0221∗∗∗ 0.0205∗∗∗ 0.0157∗∗∗
(0.00515) (0.00435) (0.00446) (0.00425) (0.00431) (0.00435) (0.00436) (0.00506)
Obs 27517 27514 27519 27520 27522 27520 27515 27509
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Each column presents results from a fixed
effect municipality-level regression. Sample is restricted to those municipality-years with Bolsa data.
Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the municipality, the number of schools by location
and jurisdiction, population and municipal GDP in natural logs and in levels, the number and
education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and 5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 56: Municipality student flows (no lags): promoted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 7 Grade 8
Cycles 0.0412∗∗∗ 0.00313 0.0211∗∗∗ -
0.00009
0.0262∗∗∗ 0.0221∗∗∗ 0.0205∗∗∗ 0.0156∗∗∗
(0.00516) (0.00435) (0.00446) (0.00425) (0.00431) (0.00435) (0.00435) (0.00506)
bolsa 0.00264 0.00424 0.00465 0.00408 0.00326 0.00310 0.00452 0.00565
(0.00415) (0.00338) (0.00342) (0.00369) (0.00331) (0.00333) (0.00322) (0.00357)
Obs 27517 27514 27519 27520 27522 27520 27515 27509
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Each column presents results from a
fixed effect municipality-level regression. Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the
municipality, the number of schools by location and jurisdiction, population and municipal GDP
in natural logs and in levels, the number and education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and
5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 57: Municipality student flows (no lags) - Bolsa sample: dropped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 7 Grade 8
Cycles 0.000607 0.00190 0.000398 -
0.00112
-
0.00213
-
0.004∗∗
-
0.00099
-
0.007∗∗∗
(0.00166) (0.00135) (0.00142) (0.00130) (0.00182) (0.00181) (0.00187) (0.00193)
Obs 27517 27514 27519 27520 27522 27520 27515 27509
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Each column presents results from a fixed
effect municipality-level regression. Sample is restricted to those municipality-years with Bolsa data.
Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the municipality, the number of schools by location
and jurisdiction, population and municipal GDP in natural logs and in levels, the number and
education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and 5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table 58: Municipality student flows (no lags): dropped
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5 Grade 6 Grade 7 Grade 8
Cycles 0.000609 0.00190 0.000407 -
0.00112
-
0.00213
-
0.004∗∗
-
0.00099
-
0.007∗∗∗
(0.00166) (0.00135) (0.00142) (0.00130) (0.00182) (0.00181) (0.00187) (0.00193)
bolsa -
0.00057
-
0.00104
-
0.00197
-
0.00006
-
0.00001
-
0.00028
-
0.0005
-
0.0046∗∗∗
(0.00150) (0.00118) (0.00128) (0.00129) (0.00164) (0.00152) (0.00167) (0.00161)
Obs 27517 27514 27519 27520 27522 27520 27515 27509
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Each column presents results from a
fixed effect municipality-level regression. Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the
municipality, the number of schools by location and jurisdiction, population and municipal GDP
in natural logs and in levels, the number and education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and
5-8, and state-time interactions.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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C.8 Inclusion of time interactions
In Appendix B.1 we demonstrated that neither our standard controls, nor some ad-
ditional controls, had economically economically significant effects on the share of
schools in a municipality who use the social promotion policy. Table 59 replicate
our main results, using the baseline controls augmented with year-interacted polit-
ical variables and 1995 repetitions rates (note that the inclusion of 1995 repetition
rates restricts the sample to those municipalities which existed in that year). The
additional controls and sample adjustment in Table 59 reduce the magnitude of some
parameter values slightly, but does not change our main conclusions.
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Table 59: Share of age group delayed one or more grades: additional con-
trols
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 8 Age 9 Age 10 Age 11 Age 12
Cycles -0.0217∗∗∗ -0.0133∗∗∗ -0.0126∗∗∗ -0.0126∗∗∗ -0.00512
(0.00394) (0.00383) (0.00336) (0.00361) (0.00364)
L.Cycles -0.0245∗∗∗ -0.0121∗∗∗ -0.0122∗∗∗ -0.00871∗∗ -0.0131∗∗∗
(0.00386) (0.00379) (0.00342) (0.00407) (0.00378)
L2.Cycles -0.00845∗∗ -0.0153∗∗∗ -0.0146∗∗∗ -0.00568 -0.00298
(0.00375) (0.00393) (0.00366) (0.00470) (0.00458)
L3.Cycles -0.00566 -0.00804∗∗ -0.0128∗∗∗ -0.0101∗∗
(0.00352) (0.00360) (0.00465) (0.00476)
L4.Cycles -0.00280 -0.0127∗∗∗ -0.0103∗∗
(0.00336) (0.00449) (0.00429)
L5.Cycles -0.00150 -0.00434
(0.00419) (0.00378)
Observations 29816 24848 19878 14911 14911
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by municipality. Each column presents results from a fixed
effect municipality-level regression. Controls (not shown): the number of schools in the municipality,
the number of schools by location and jurisdiction, population and municipal GDP in natural logs
and in levels, the number and education scores of teachers teaching grades 1-4 and 5-8, state-time
interactions, as well as year dummies interacted with mayor-president affiliation, mayor-governor
affiliation and 1995 repetition rate.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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